A very good purchase, this collection of articles proceeds chronologically through the first part of the year 1945. 130 A-4 size pages. At first it gives the development of the situation in the autumn of 1944 followed by an article on the Operation Bodenplatte, the surprise attack against Allied airfields on January 1, 1945 by the Luftwaffe.

This  12 pages article is good but of course if one wants a definite account of the operation the real thing, Manhro’s and Pütz’ excellent Bodenplatte book is a must, but that is of course not surprising. The text is informative and the photos are well-chosen. The figures of the LW losses are clearly taken from Manhro’s and Pütz’ book but they are only partially given, the infomation that 47% of the LW losses were by Allied AA and 23% were by Allied fighters is only a partial truth because according to the Manhro’s and Pütz’ book in addition 5% of the losses were by either Allied AA or Allied fighters and 11% were to unknown causes. The German flak, contrary to the old myth, contributed only 5% of the German losses.

The story of the shooting down of three Mistels by four P-51 Mustangs from the 55th Fighter Group on Feb 3, 1945 is a good one. It gives besides the good information on the combat a brief history of the Mistel and the planned attack on Scapa Flow by Mistels and flare-dropping Ju 88s and 188s and the fates of the four Mustang pilots during the last few months of the war. Out of the four one was shot down by the deadly German Flak and went missing, possibly murdered by furious civilians, another became a prisoner of war when his attempt to rescue a friend downed by Flak failed and one was killed either because he stalled at low level or because of he was shot down by ground fire.

Squadron Leader Clive Rowley has written an interesting article on the Australian ace Tony Gaze’s life. While serving in the RAF Gaze got 1½ jet kills while flying Spitfire XIVs before being posted on May 1, 1945 to command ‘A’ Flight of 616 Squadron on Meteor III jets. Naturally the eight pages article concentrates on his combat career and its ups and downs. The only complain I have is that Me 262s of KG 51 is sometimes given as a Me 262 of JG 51, which is totally wrong, JG 51 was a conventional fighter unit equipped in 1944 – 45 with Bf 109Gs and fighting in the Eastern Front, the only exception was the IV./JG 51 which during the last month of the war was equipped with Fw 190s, before that it also had Bf 109Gs. Also the KG(J) 51,  which Rowley sometimes uses, is wrong, the unit was a bomber/fighter-bomber unit not a fighter unit formed out of a bomber unit. Rowley gives a different WNr. and code to Gaze’s Me 262 victim, 500064 and 9K+CL than John Foreman and S. E. Harvey in their a bit dated Me 262 Combat Diary, 110615 and 9K+NL but the unit and the pilot are same even if both give the unit designation wrongly. Smith and Creek agree with Foreman and Harvey in the WNr., they don’t give the code, and give the unit designation rightly. But Andreas Brekken’s/Aviation History Society Norway’s webpage agree with Rowley see http://www.ahs.no/ref_db/lw_loss_public.asp?lossid=103175, so while both Andreas and Smith & Creek are very good researchers in this case I tend to believe Andress in that at least in loss documents the WNr. and code is given as 500064 and 9K+CL.

The eight pages Natter article is very good.

Yaks over Köningsberg, the story of the French Normandie-Niemen fighter regiment operations over Kaliningrad area/East Prussia in the early part of 1945, pure chronology based only information from one side other than the OoB of the Luftwaffe’s Luftflotte 6 on the 11 January 1945. One notice on it, while it is true that ground-attack versions of Fw 190s could be used as pure fighters as the author writes they were handicapped by the weight of their extra armour. In the introduction part of the article unit’s pilot losses during its early part of existence are compared to the claimed victories which is doubly misleading, firstly over-claiming was common in all air forces and secondly pilot losses were fewer than aircraft losses. Luckily in the main part of the article which tells the story of its participation to the fighting over East-Prussia also those losses where pilots survived are mentioned.

Ram Them! is a good blow-to-blow article on the Sonderkommando Elbe’s ramming attacks on April 7, 1945 with well-chosen B/W photos. It concentrates to the action between SKdo Elbe and USAAF heavy bombers and doesn’t spend much space on the fighter vs fighter combats between Luftwaffe fighters and USAAF escorts, mentioning only a couple air victories achieved by P-51 pilots or delve much the moral/ethical discussion amongst German commanders on the advisably of ramming attacks. But that is quite understandably, in a short article like this it is good to have a clear focus. The author is in opinion that only ten bombers were lost to the Elbe pilots while Weir in his book on the subject writes that USAAF seems to have lost 13 bombers to the Sonderkommando Elbe pilots. Also according to Caldwell’s Day fighters book Sonderkommando Elbe pilots got 13 or 14 bombers. According to Freeman’s The Mighty Eight War Diary at least eight and according to Boehme’s JG 7 history twelve heavy bombers at most. In the end of the article there is a short note on the Oberst Hajo Herrmann’s final wartime scheme – Sonderkommando Bienenstock, demolition teams flown on Fieseler Fi 156 Storck light STOL planes behind enemy lines.

King of Fighters The Best Single-seater of 1945.
The author rightly pointed out the importance of pilot quality in fighter combat and so paper figures were not all important The article claims that Bell P-63 Kingcobras were used against Germany in small numbers by the Soviets but because of the lack of corroborating evidence Yefim Gordon in his Soviet Air Power in World War 2 (2008) and in his and Sergey Komissarov’s US Aircraft in the Soviet Union and Russia (2008) writes that he/they stick(s) to the generally accepted version of events that the Kingcobras did not see combat on the Soviet-German front. So in its place there should be Bell P-39Q or N, if one Lend-Lease Eastern Front plane is wanted to be included. And why not, P-39 was widely used by Soviets until the end of the war and three (2nd, 3rd and 5th) of their five top aces got most of their kills while flying Airacobra.
While generally acceptable article but on the Soviet fighters there are a number of points on which I have a different view. The maximum climb rate given for the Spitfire LF Mk. IX (4,470 ft/min) seems to be that of the much rarer HF Mk. IX, which was lower than that of the real one for LF Mk IX, namely 5,080 ft/min at sea level and 4,725 ft/min at 2,000 ft with the boost of +25 lb/sq.inch. while using 100/150 grade fuel, and with +18 lb/sq.inch boost (100/130 grade fuel) 4,620 ft/min at sea level. As for Spitfire Mk. XIV the given 4,700 ft/min is correct for +18 lb/sq.inch boost, but during the last 1½ months of the war in Europe +21 lb/sq.inch boost was allowed with 100/150 grade fuel making possible the climb rate of almost 5,100 ft/min at sea level. On the contrary the rate of climb given to Tempest Mk. V (4,700 ft/min) seems to be optimistic, the maximum figure I have seen is 4,380 ft/min at sea level.
On Republic P-47 Thunderbolt the Spitfire version to which it and North American P-51 Mustang are compared is missing, the claims made are true only when the US planes are compared to Spitfire Mk. XIV, Spitfire LF Mk. IX was slower than P-51D at all altitudes and slower than P-47D at medium and high altitudes. And both mentioned US fighters zoomed better than any WWII era Spitfire. And not only Mustang but all WWII fighters powered by liquid-cooled engines were vulnerable to even light battle damage to their cooling system.
Contrary to claim of the author, P-38L didn’t lack stopping power, its armament, while not exceptionally heavy, was a good average for a late war fighter.
Lockheed P-80A had the same six .5 M2 as P-51D Mustang but its machine guns were all concentrated to the nose giving more concentrated and effective fire pattern.
While the first Lavochkin La-7s that reached combat zone had max speed of 406 mph and rate of climb 3,396 fpm, the late La-7s from late 1944 onwards had max speed of 418 mph and rate of climb 4,762 fpm , so in early 1945 and under 2,000m only Hawker Tempest was faster than it and Bf 109K-4 had equal speed. Spitfire Mk. XIV with +21lb boost became faster at little under 3,000 m and with +18lb boost at little under 4,000 m. Spitfire Mk XIV with +21lb boost out climbed it at all altitudes as did Bf 109K-4, but Spitfire Mk. XIV with +18lb only above appr. 1,500 m. La-7 was an excellent low- and medium altitude fighter and these were the altitudes where most of the Eastern Front air combats were fought. It suffered from engine unreliability which arose from the engine installation not from the engine itself. And while roll-over bar was recommended for production La-7s, according to Ves̆ts̆ík’s Lavoc̆kin La-7 book it wasn’t installed and that seems to be the case. But it isn’t all bad, according to the article La-7 had bigger spinner than La-5FN, I don’t remember seeing that information before but when I measured the spinners from the line drawings in Gordon’s Lavochkin’s Piston-Engined Fighters the results confirmed that. So at least according to the line drawings the information is correct. A pair more complains; the second photo seems to shows a Lavochkin La-5F not a La-7 and La-7 was powered by Shvetsov ASh-82FN not by ASh-82FNV, maybe the author means Shvetsov M-82FNV which was the prototype/pre-production version of the engine of which was installed in La-5FNs and La-7s. Its production version was at first designated as Shvetsov M-82FN but soon re-designated as Shvetsov ASh-82FN to honour its chief designer Arkadiy Shvetsov.
On Yak-3 there is a bit different problem, according to Gordon’s Soviet Air Power book the max. speed of it was 398 mph not 407 mph given in the article, but performance, especially the maximum level speed, of the partly wooden Soviet fighters varied even more than the metal Western ones. And I have seen Soviet/Russian graphs showing both 401 and 405 mph as the maximum speed for Yak-3. But again it is the maximum rate of climb that is my main problem, the table in the article shows 3,650 fpm while Soviet graphs showed 4,330 fpm, which is the rate of climb that would explain why Soviet pilots had so high regard on that little fighter and why German pilots thought it being so dangerous opponent. It seems that the author has got his Soviet aircraft specifications from Wikipedia, where somebody has calculated the Soviet rates of climb by simply using the time to altitude information from Gordon’s Soviet Air Power book and converting it to a rate of climb by dividing the altitude (16,400 ft) by the time needed to reach it. The results definitely aren’t the maximum rates of climb of those planes.
While as I wrote above, it seems that Bell P-63 Kingcobra didn’t see combat in Europe during the WWII, the climb data given in article seems to be too low, the internet site says 3,600 ft/min, according to Dean it was even better. This is in line with the time to height information in Gordon’s and Wagner’s books.  According to Dean P-63 had the best rate of climb of the all USAAF fighters seeing series production during WWII.  Otherwise the description of P-63 is ok and rightly pointed out reasons why USAAF didn’t use it as a combat plane, the lack of range and high altitude performance, it was low and middle altitude fighter.
Focke-Wulf Fw 190A-9, the speed given is that without compressibility correction which is the way how German data was rather often given, so almost 10 mph too optimistic when compared other planes whose maximum speeds are usually given with compressibility correction. Also its rate of climb seems to have given as 2,350 ft/min, which is same as given in Kens’ and Nowarra’s old Die deutschen Flugzeuge 1933-1945 and Wood’s/Gunston’s Hitler’s Luftwaffe for Fw 190A-8  when a German document I have seen gives 11.7 m/s which converts to 2,303 ft/min for Fw 190A-9. The same document gives only 9.7 m/s, that is 1,909 ft/min, for Fw 190A-8 but also 14.0 m/s (2,756 ft/min) with emergency power with increased boost.  On the other hand 3,445 ft/min for Fw 190A-8 with 1.42 ata boost is given in my very poor copy of the Focke-Wulf Flugzeugbau-Flugmechanic-L graph dated 12 Jan 1944. The maximum RoC isn’t better with 1,68 ata but this higher boost gives significantly better RoC between 1.500m and 5.500m. The figure 2,677 ft/min A-8 1.32 ata is given in Focke-Wulf Flugzeugbau-Flugmechanic-L graph dated 13 Nov 1943. A Soviet test gives maximum 3,563 ft/min with special power and 3,150 ft/min with the combat power (probably means Steig- und Kampfleistung) but the Fw 190A-8 used in it was without outer wing cannon and also had smaller fuel load and was 314 kgs lighter than the standard Fw 190A-8 in German flight tests graphs. I admit that Fw 190A-9 was a hard nut to open and in the end I didn’t find a reliable source for its rate of climb but IMHO the maximum RoC of a normal Fw 190A-9 fighter should be at least 3,445 ft/min.
The speed of Fw 190D-9 given seems to be some 8 mph optimistic relative to the delivered production aircraft because it assumes the installation of the engine gap seal. On the other hand, the speculation that the speed without MW50 might has been as low as 360 mph is rather odd, Soviet data gives that speed as appr. 390 mph, and Soviet data for Fw 190s tended to be clearly lower than values in German or Western Allied documents. Also the rate of climb value given, 3,300 ft/min, is rather conservative, in early 1945 Fw 190D-9 was capable to 3,405 ft/min with take-off power and 4,232 ft/min with special emergency power (Sonder-Notleistung).
I would not call Messerschmitt Bf 109 as long-suffering. On the Bf 109K-4, only the Bf 109K prototype had a slightly bulged canopy, the production machines had the standard Erla/Galland canopy.
The DB605DM was cleared up to 1.75ata, the DB605DB pushed the limit up to 1.8ata, and both could be sustained with use of either B4 fuel + MW-50 (as mentioned in various documents, even if it was an afterthought in the DM case) or with C3 fuel. With 1.8 ata boost and 2,800 rpm 605DB produced 1,850 ps/1,825 hp. Without MW-50 with B4 fuel it produced 1,430 ps/1,410 hp. However the DB605DC max power, with 1.98 ata boost and 2,800 rpm could be achieved only with use of C3+MW-50. It then produced 2,000 ps/1,973 hp. Problems were the scarcity of methanol for the MW-50 and the limited supply of high octane C3 for Bf 109 units because Fw 190As and Fs could use only it, so usually Bf 109 units had to be content with lower octane B4.
The given range seems to be too short when compared to the Spitfires but the same figure is given in Poruba’s and Janda’s Messerschmitt Bf 109K book. On the other hand Martinek’s article gives the range of Bf 109G-10 as 650 km, which converts into 404 miles and G-10, while otherwise very similar to K-4, had fixed tailwheel and lacked the outer wheel well covers (but often the tailwheel was locked down and outer wheel well covers removed in operational K-4s) so it’s range should have been shorter than that of K-4 or when compared to a K-4 with modifications just given in parentheses, the same. A plane had many different ranges depending on engine settings used and the flight altitude but IMHO the 404 miles range is truer when compared the ranges of Spitfires given in the article.
Messerschmitt Me 262 part is OK but again there was no KG(J) 51, it was simply KG 51.
Messerschmitt Me 163, MK 108 wasn’t slow firing with its 650 rounds/min rate of fire but it had fairly low muzzle velocity, 540 m/s (1,770 ft/s).
On the conclusion part of the article, IMFO Meteor III wasn’t non-operational but because of snaking and its poor rate of roll it wasn’t a top-class fighter in 1945. In the end the author concludes that the choice for the title of the best fighter in the ETO has to be made between Spitfire XIV and Me 262 and he chooses Spitfire XIV. I agree, that if the choice is made without thinking of the range and the combat altitude, the choice is between the two but even with the haste and desperate situation in which Me 262 was rushed into service and all the problems which followed from that, Me 262 would have dominated the duel between these two planes if the combat had begun from equal positions. Spitfire might survive because of its better horizontal manoeuvrability and acceleration but to win it should have to surprise the Me 262 or the Me 262 pilot should have to make a bad error.
So while otherwise passable article on the late war fighters in ETO it fails badly on the Soviet planes.

Then Wee Willie Ran out of Luck, an excellent article on the “career” of the Boeing B-17G-15-BO 42-31333 Wee Willie” and some of the numerous crews who flow combat mission on it during its 128 missions. Also showing the dramatic pictures of its fiery end on April 8, 1945 over Stendal on its 128th mission. My only complaint is that I’d have liked information on what was done to it at the completion and modification centre at Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Next article is on Hans-Guido Mutke’s dive on April 9, 1945. IMHO a bit unnecessary article because we had only Mutke’s word on the incident and he came into public with his story only 44 years after the incident. But this article takes only two pages and also tells how Mutke flying the Me 262A-1a/R1 “White 3” WNr. 500071 ended in Switzerland on 25 April 1945. The plane is nowadays at the Deutsches Museum in München.

Canadians against the Komet. An interesting article, but it still does not give a definite answer what was the target of the only combat use of the Sondergerät SG 500 Jagdfaust. Not that I criticize the author, it is often impossible to dig out the truth because of the overclaiming and conflicting eyewitness report. The lack of the Luftwaffe records doesn’t help, more so when we talked about the last months of the war with all the chaos on the German side. The author things that the Me 163 pilot Fritz Kelb attacked one of the Lancasters of 433 Squadron RCAF or 405 Squadron RCAF. According to Ethell’s & Price’s book, Kelb shot down a B-17. Different Wiki articles give different victim. Wiki article on Me 163 says “resulting in the destruction of a Halifax bomber, although other sources say it was a Boeing B-17”, Wikiarticle on Sondergerät SG 500 Jagdfaust says that “Fritz Kelb downed an RAF Lancaster using it.”

Then a two pages article on the well-known combat between a Piper L-4 Grasshopper and Fieseler Fi 156 Storch.

Piston Engine Zenit, a good and impartial article on Focke-Wulf Ta 152. At first a very short overview of the development and production of the Ta 152 followed by a description of its combat use at JG 301.  But the author forgot the very brief JG 11 part, it got 4 to 6 Ta 152s near the end of April 1945, but during its last movement during the war, from Neustadt-Glewe to Leck, two out of a formation of four Ta152s from the Stab JG11 were shot down by Spitfires during the transfer flight and the third had to make a belly-landing at Lech airfield.

Then an article on a murder of a shot down USAAF P-51 pilot.

And then the article which gave the tittle of this publication, Spitfires Over Berlin, the story of a Spitfire XIV formation from 350 (Belgian) Squadron combating with Focke-Wulf Fw 190s over the western fringes of Berlin. The Belgian side is well told but there is next to nothing on the German side, so very one-sided story. Besides the quotes from the Allied pilots’ combat reports the other interesting point is a couple photos showing rather battered Spitfire XIVs of the 350 (Belgian) Squadron, fitness of some parts of the engine cowling seemed to have been rather poor.

On the other hand the next article on the activities of the Luftwaffe on April 24, 1945 is interesting, even if the situation was hopeless to Germans and fuel reserves were very low, the Luftwaffe flew over 800 combat sortie on that day, of which nearly 500 were fighter sorties, almost 250 fighter-bomber, ground-attack and anti-tank sorties and some 90 recce, most flown by Fw 190s and Bf 109s. With only six pages it is only a short overview as the author himself admit but very interesting one.

The Ringmaster’s Grand Finale. April 26, 1945: JV44 and Adolf Galland.  The article is a good one, so I have nothing to complain on it but the subject. JG 7 was much more important Me 262 fighter unit than Galland’s JV 44 but much less well known, at least in English speaking world, so I would have been much more eager to see an article on the former unit.

Then a nice article on the Heinkel He 162A and the only possible air kill achieved by a He 162A pilot. It also gives information on the all nine fatal accidents suffered by He 162A pilots during its use in WW2, a couple more French and British pilots died in He 162A accidents after the war but that is outside the scope of this publication. These is even a photo of the wreck of Flying Officer Tom Austin‘s Tempest V JN877 but it is also clearly stated that we will probably never know for sure if Leutnant Rudolf Schmitt shot down the Tempest because of the time difference and not even the place where the Tempest crashed was exactly a match with the combat area reported by Schmitt. Austin reported that he had suffered a catastrophic engine failure and some sources say that the loss was allocated to a German AA unit. There are several fairly small photos of He 162As but what I miss is a photo showing the ventilation disc on the port side of the canopy of He 162.

The last but one article, Final Dogfight May 8, 1945 gives one probably answer but in fact there were later air combats in Europe, mostly friendly fire cases. USAAF Lockheed F-5 photo-reconnaissance planes (unarmed version of the famous Lockheed P-38 Lightning fighter plane) of the 39th Photographic Reconnaissance Squadron/10th Photographic Group, belonging to the 9th U.S. Air Force were then operating from Y-10 airfield in Wiesbaden, Germany.
On 8 May 1945, the unit was on a Prisoner-of-War Camp Pin-Pointing Mission in Dresden airspace, i.e. in the area recently seized by Soviet troops. Several Soviet Yak fighters of the 106th Guards Fighter Air Regiment from Cottbus airfield attacked Captain Malcolm L. Nash. Second Lieutenant Lazuta wrongly took Nash´s F-5E for a German Focke Wulf Fw 189 (twin-fuselage plane like F-5), and shot it down in Reichenbach area, approx. 40 kilometres West of Dresden. Captain Nash made a belly landing in the field. Though he escaping serious injury his F-5E was totally demolished.
On 9 May 1945 afternoon, the 39th Photo-Reconnaissance Squadron sent six Lockheed F-5s to search for the missing Capt. Nash. Two of the F-5s piloted by 1/Lt Thomas P. Petrus and 2/Lt. Thomas Jackson, flew as far as Prague. By coincidence, this happened when six Soviet US built Bell P-39 Airacobras patrolled the area. They were part of the 100th Guards Fighter Air Regiment. Soviet fighters covered Soviet tanks advancing to Prague, and one of them, Major Vasilyi A. Pschenitchnikov, took the American twin-fuselage F-5 for a German Fw 189 and shot down the plane over Prague. While 1/Lt Petrus, suffering heavy burns, saved his life on parachute, Maj. Pschenitchnikov on his return added to his score the kill of „Fw 189“, his thirteenth and the last WW2 kill.
There was also at least one another dogfight on 9 May: Ju88, from possibly II/KG200 (144032), was attacked and damaged by FAA fighters over Skagerrak.
And on 11May 1945 Anson XII PH539 of the Desert Air Force Communication Flight was attacked by three Yak fighters while off course. It force-landed in a field near Graz, Austria and struck trees.

The last article is Aftermath May 9, 1945 and beyond. It is on the Allied war booty planes and scientific intelligence during the last days of the war and immediate afterwards. There is a list of the Watson’s Whizzers’ Me 262s and a list of the German aircraft captured by the British and US. Surprisingly it seems that  British gave all four Focke-Wulf 190Ds they had captured to US while they kept few 190As and F-8s plus a two of the three Ta 152Hs themselves.  Not surprisingly there are many night-fighters, mostly Junkers Ju 88G-6s but I was a little surprised of the number of Messerschmitt Me 163Bs captured by British, at least 23.

All in all I am very positively surprised at this purchase, almost all articles are good and interesting with well-chosen pictures, almost all them clear even if some are rather small in size. It gives interesting and many-sided picture of the last five months of the air war on the Western Front. Only major complains is the lack of articles on the Soviet Air Forces and the underestimations of the performance of Soviet fighters.

Main sources:
Motorenmustern for DB 605D series engines

Boehme, Manfred, JG 7 The World’s First Jet Fighter Unit 1944/1945 (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 1992).
Caldwell, Donald, Day Fighters in Defence of the Reich A War Diary, 1942 – 45 (Barnsley: Frontline Books,
               2011).
Dean, Francis H., America’s Hundred-Thousand The U.S. Production Fighters of World War II (Atglen, PA:
               Schiffer Publishing, 1997).
Ethell, Jeffrey & Price, Alfred, World War II Fighting Jets (Shrewsbury: Airlife Publishing, 1994).
Foreman, John and Harvey, S. E., Me 262 Combat Diary (New Malden: Air Research Publications, 1990).
Freeman, Roger A., The Mighty Eight War Diary (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1990).
Gordon, Yefim, Lavochkin’s Piston-Engined Fighters (Hinckley: Midland Publishing, 2003).
Gordon, Yefim, Soviet Air Power in World War 2 (Hinckley: Midland Publishing, 2008).
Hermann, Dietmar & Wunderlich, Markus, Die kurze Karriere der Focke-Wulf Ta 152, Flugzeug Classic, Apr.
                2010.
Kens, Karlheinz and Nowarra, Heinz J., Die deutschen Flugzeuge 1933-1945 (München: J.F. Lehmann Verlag,
                2. Ausgabe, 1964)
Manhro, John and Pütz, Ron, Bodenplatte The Luftwaffe’s Last Hope (Crowborough: Hikoki Publications,
                2004).
Martinek, Josef, ‘Bf 109G-10 – the most agile “Gustav”’, Zlínek, No. 4 / Vol. III.
Murawski, Marek J., JG 1 “Oesau” 1944-1945 (Lublin: KAGERO, 2002).
Poruba,T and Janda, A, Messerschmitt Bf 109K (Hradec Králové: JaPo, 1997).
Price, Alfred, The Spitfire Story (London: Cassell & Co, Revised Second Edition, 2002).
Shores, Christopher and Williams, Clive, Aces High (London: Grub Street 1994).
Smith, J. Richard and Creek, Eddie j., Me 262 Volume Three (Crowborough: Classic Publications, 2000).
Ves̆ts̆ík, Milos̆, Lavoc̆kin La-7 (Praha: MBI, 2000).
Wagner, Ray (Ed.), American Combat Planes (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., New
               Revised Edition, 1968)
Weir, Adrian, The Last Flight of the Luftwaffe (London: Cassell & Co, 2000).
Wood, Tony/Gunston, Bill, Hitler’s Luftwaffe. A pictorial and technical encyclopedia of Hitler’s air power in
               World War II (:Leisure Books, Reprinted, 1984).

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spitfire-IX.html
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spit14v109.html
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/P-63/P-63.html
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/fw190/leistungsdaten-1-10-44.jpg
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/fw190/fw190d9test.html
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/Methanol.pdf
http://users.atw.hu/kurfurst/articles/MW_KvsXIV.htm  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daimler-Benz_DB_605#Variants
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Messerschmitt_Me_163_Komet
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jagdfaust
http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/showthread.php?t=40780
http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/showthread.php?t=7258

Smith, J. Richard and Creek Eddie J., Me 262 Volume One. Classic Publications Burgess Hill, West Sussex 1997. ISBN 0 9526867 2 4. 224 pages, Dimensions: 30.6 x 22.8 x 2 cm

Simply an excellent book, full of relevant information, technical drawings and specifications. It is also a book for modelers, plenty of good quality b/w and some colour photographs, many colour profiles and an appendix on Luftwaffe’s camouflage and markings. Unfortunately difficult and very expensive to get nowadays.

This volume, the first of four, covers development of the Me 262 from its initiation to the eve of the beginning of its operational testing, in other words to the end of 1943 but the development history is taken to mid- 1944, with information on the use and careers of the ten prototypes and the first seven pre-production aircraft (Me 262 S1 – S7) and the initial production methods.

The book begins with good survey of Willy Messerschmitt’s career and the history of his firm, altogether 26 pages.
Then followed a 16 pages thorough chapter on the German jet engine development, which covers well the three jet engines that influenced the design of the Me 262 (BMW P3304, BMW P3302 (BMW 003) and Jumo 004). The BMW 003A, a different engine from the P3302, which flew in later Me 262 development aircraft, is also discussed, even if it did not influence the airframe design.  The story of the development of Me 262 itself began on the page 56. The book has many photographs of wind-tunnel models that were prepared to evaluate the several stages of airframe design that began with what looks like a straight-wing Me 309 derivative or cousin and ended with the swept-wing fighter that went to production. Also other descriptions of technical matters is very good e.g. the descriptions of Zeiss TSA 2D and Lofte 7H bomb sights

There are four appendices:
Appendix. 1. Camouflage and Markings
Appendix. 2. Me 262 Prototype Flights
Appendix. 3. German Reaction Engine Designation System
Appendix. 4. Messerschmitt Personalities and Company Organization. This is an extensive list of Messerschmitt personalities, often accompanied with a micro biography.

For modellers the Appendix 1 is interesting, for those interested in Me 262:n development the Appendices 2 and 4 are very useful.

Difficult to find something to criticize but there is always something.  
The index could be more detailed and there are some annoying typos. Also when the writers wonder why Hitler didn’t cancel his order to concentrate initially purely on the Me 262 Jabo/bomber versions soon after the D-Day when the main reason behind his reasoning, the ability of Jabo/bomber version to bomb invading Allied troops on the beaches, had disappeared they forget the effect of the Operation Fortitude, which kept Germans waiting for the “main landing” because it deluded them to believe that the D-Day was only a diversion. And there are some errors when the authors write on some side topics, e.g. the claim that LW was able to fly only about 100 sorties on D-Day, when the right figure is 300+. Also their claim on the effectiveness of the ‘Big Week’ seems to be based on what Allied thought they had achieved, at least German aircraft production figures don’t show the level of production drop in March1944 mentioned in the book.

And thanks to Arno for lending his copy.

Forczyk’s book is IMHO good. For its size it gives a good background information, describes enough the actions and gives good overview on the importance of Focke-Wulf Fw 200C to the Battle of Atlantic and reasons for its early successes and its ultimate failure against Allied convoys. The two maps convey very well the essentials of Condors’ anti-convoy operations and the four tables are clear and convey well the essential information as do the diagrams on anti-aircraft systems of armed merchant ships  and low-level attack  tactic used by Condors. But there is at least one mistake in the table “Condor losses by cause”. The 3rd column header “AA from land/merchant ship” should be “AA from merchant ship/ land” or the numbers in the column should be reversed.

Typically to Duel series there is chronology and two minibiographies, that of Edgar Petersen, quite self-evident choice and that of Eric Brown, the very famous test pilot, maybe not so self-evident choice but Brown was one of the Martlet pilots on the Royal Navy’s  first escort carrier HMS Audacity whole of its short career and claimed two Fw 200 Condors. And the arrival of escort carriers was really the turning point  in the Fw 200 Condors vs Atlantic convoys battle.

Forczyk is more in home with Condor than with Royal Navy's  weapon systems. Contrary what Forczyk writes, 12pdr(3”) wasn’t the main heavy AA gun of Royal Navy in 30s, 4” was and at the end of decade 4.5” dual purpose gun had entered  in service. 12pdr might be the most common heavy AA gun installed onto merchant vessels during the WWII but that is a different thing.  And the rate of fire wasn’t the main problem of 2pdr pom-pom besides the unreliability of early versions, it wasn’t significantly lower than that of excellent 40mm Bofors, but the fairly low muzzle velocity of the pom-pom was.

The Royal Navy had begun to understand the need for anti-aircraft protection of Great Britain’s merchant shipping by late 30s and sloops constructed in late 30s had powerful AA armament. Bittern-class sloops, 2 of the 3 ships had six 4" AA guns (3x2), HACS AA fire control director, four .5" AA guns (1x4) and Egret-class sloops, 3 ships, 8 x 4-inch AA guns (4x2), Fuze Keeping Clock AA fire control system, 4 x .5-inch AA (1x4) were commissioned 1936 – 39 and just nearing completion were first of the  Black Swans, 12 were launched between 1939 and 1943, including four for the Royal Indian Navy; twenty-five Modified Black Swans were launched between 1942 and 1945, including two for the Royal Indian Navy. Their armament was 6 × QF 4 in (102 mm) Mk XVI AA guns (3 × 2), Fuze Keeping Clock AA fire control system, 4 × 2pdr AA pom-pom plus 4 × 0.5-inch (12.7 mm) AA machine guns (original), 12 × 20 mm Oerlikon AA (6 × 2) (modified). The first of Black Swans was commissioned on 3 November 1939 and the second on 27 January 1940 and 3 more during the first part of 41, i.e. at the height of the Condor menace.

Also there were the Hunts of which 19 were commissioned in 1940. They were modeled on the 1938 escort sloop Bittern. The Hunt class was to ship the same armament of three twin Mark XIX mounts for the QF 4-inch (102 mm) gun Mark XVI. The guns were controlled by a Fuze Keeping Clock AA fire control computer when engaging aircraft plus a quadruple QF 2 pounder mount Mark VII. While sloops were restricted to speeds under 20knots by a treaty Hunts were small destroyers with top speed of 27 knots (50 km/h). The first twenty were ordered in March and April 1939. They were constructed to Admiralty standards, as were contemporary destroyers, unlike the frigates which conformed much more to mercantile practice. The demanding specifications in an overworked Admiralty design department resulted in a major design miscalculation. When the detailed calculations were done the centre of gravity was lower than expected and the beam was increased. As the first ships were being completed it was found that the design was as much as 70 tons overweight, top heavy, leaving them dangerously deficient in stability. The first twenty ships were so far advanced in construction that it was necessary to remove the 'X' 4 inch mount and add 50 tons of permanent ballast. These ships became the Type I group, and had the multiple 2 pounder gun relocated from behind the funnel to the more advantageous 'X' position. The design deficiency of the Type I was rectified by splitting the hulls lengthwise and adding a 2½ foot section, increasing the beam and the margin of stability sufficiently for the designed armament to be shipped. These ships became the Type II group. Under the 1939 Emergency War Programme 36 more Hunts had been ordered: three of these were completed to the original (Type I) design.

The main problem for the RN was that the unexpected collapse of France and occupation of Norway by Germany not only opened opportunity for Condors to attack against southern convoy routes but also allowed medium-bomber anti-shipping attacks in Irish Sea and in the waters around Ireland, so these ships were urgently needed besides the North Sea also in this new danger area.

Analyze seems otherwise good, but near the end the 20mm Oerlikon fixation goes to annoying dimensions. Even after Forczyk has told that the more powerful anti-aircraft protection of convoys had forced KG 40 to abandon the low-level attacks and with the new Fw 200C-4 version, which was equipped with the good Lofte 7B bombsight, it began to bomb from 3,000m (10,000ft) to avoid light automatic AA fire, he still regard the number of Oerlikons as measurement of how good AA defense a convoy had.

Another small error in the book is that the first escort carrier with a hangar deck wasn’t HMS Biter but both HMS Archer and HMS Avenger  had begun to escort convoys already during the spring 1942.

In spite of some errors the book is a good introduction to Fw 200 Condor and its use as maritime bomber and reconnaissance bomber and the Allied efforts to combat this menace.