This is a very good book, I like especially the description of Char B1 bis and of the formation of Divisions Cuirasée de Réserve (DCR).  The duel section focuses on the first part of the battle of Stonne (May 15 – 16, 1940). In the book the description of the interiors of the tanks and the crew positions and the duties of the crew is good and enlightening. There are also good interior photos on the stations of the commander and the driver in Char B1 bis but not on those in PzKpfw IV. That doesn’t bother me because I have been inside a PzKpfw IV and have seen many photos and drawings of its interior but even if PzKpfw IV is more commonly known than Char B1 bis not all readers are familiar with its interior, so IMHO it would have been good also to have some photos inside PzKpfw IV. But on the other hand there are colour drawings on the crew placements in both tanks, on commander’s and driver’s positions in Char B1 bis and on the turret layout in PzKpfw IV. Also the colour drawings on 75mm ammunitions and on the views through gun sights are very interesting. There is also a very good photo on the powertrain of Char B1 bis.

Zaloga rightly constantly mentioned that French were late starters and so their armoured units had had less time for unit training than their German counterparts. Even many Char B1 bis crews had had too little time to achieve adequate proficiency with their new tanks. And because the combat effectiveness is based on co-operation he rightly mentioned that Divisions Cuirasée de Réserve (DCR) were very recently established, the 1e and 2e Divisions Cuirasée de Réserve began forming in January 1940 and the 3e DCR only in March 1940. De Gaulle’s 4e DCR was a last minute improvisation and began forming after the German attack.

Zaloga also emphasized the importance of the decentralized Auftragstaktik to German successes during the early part of the WW2. It was local initiative vs strict control and micromanagement common to Germany’s enemies, including France in 1940.

Zaloga draws attention to the fact that the French decision to put ½ of their tanks in Divisions Cuirasée and Divisions Légère Mécanique and the rest mostly to the independent tank battalions was not odd, the Soviet and US Armies organized their tanks much the same way in 1944.

One major shortcoming in the book is the lack of organization charts of Panzer division, DCR and why not also that of Division Légère Mécanique  (DLM) even if the latter is not directly relevant to Panzer IV vs Char B1 bis duel. But its organization was, contrary to that of DCR, very similar to that of a Panzer division in 1940. 20½ per cent of the French tanks participating the Battle of France were in DLMs, and if we leave out WWI period Renault FTs, 24½ per cent, that means almost ¼.

Zaloga constantly writes the start of the war when meaning the start of the German attack in the West on 10 May 1940. The map on the page 55 the symbol of the Army Group B, CG von Rundstedt, lacks one x, so instead of an army group it’s marked as an army. Also IMHO it would have made the map more informative if the number or the letter of the army or the army group had been put inside the unit symbol rectangles. Otherwise the two maps in the book are good giving an overview of the development of the strategic situation May 10 – 16, 1940 and the tactical situation in Stonne on May 16, 1940.

The tank strengths of Panzer Divisions given in the book are different than those given e.g. Jentz’s Panzertruppen.  What is annoying is that most of the unit histories I have access to don’t give the number of panzers the divisions had on 9 or 10 May 1940, and when given the numbers are often different from those given by Zaloga and Jentz. E.g. those given by Stoves in the history of 1st Panzer Division, he gives only the numbers per tank type of the Panzer Regiment 1 i.e. more or less ½ of the strength of the 1st Panzer Brigade, and if we add these to those given in von Lucke’s history of the Panzer Regiment 2 the sums seems to be more in line of the Zaloga’s figures than Jentz’s, the total numbers of the combat tanks on the other hand are very close, 248, 249 and 250, but there are big differences in how the totals divided per types. Also von Plato’s history of 5th Panzer Division gives exactly the same tank strength info for 5th and 7th Panzer Divisions as Zaloga. On the other hand the information in Neumann’s 4th Panzer Division history is almost identical with the Jentz’s as are those given in Gunsburg’s article The Battle of the Belgian Plain, 12 – 14 May 1940 in The Journal of Military History 56 for 3rd and 4th Panzer Division, especially the numbers of all important PzKpfw IIIs and PzKpfw IVs are identical. Also numbers in a couple others divisional histories indicate that Jentz’s figures are closer to the truth.  So IMHO after weighting the info from different secondary sources it seems to me that the Jentz’s numbers are more reliable, but of course I cannot be sure and unfortunately I have not seen the unit history of the 10th Panzer Division or other good sources on the tank strength of it in May 1940. According to Zaloga the 10th Panzer division had 48 PzKpfw IIIs and 36 PzKpfw IVs and according to Jentz 58 Pz IIIs and 32 Pz IVs  but in his text Zaloga gives almost the same tank strength of the Panzer Regiment 8, the regiment of the two panzer regiments of the 10th Panzer division which fought in Stonne, as in Jentz’s Panzertruppen, 134 vs 131 and the numbers of the all-important PzKpfw IIIs and IVs are the same, 29 PzKpfw IIIs and  16 PzKpfw IVs. So we have unambiguous tank strengths for the combatants taking part to the battle of Stonne because the strength of the 3e DCR given by Zaloga is the same Doughty gives in his book The Breaking Point (1990).  Also the tank strengths of other French armoured units given by Zaloga are usually in close agreement to those I have seen elsewhere but those of the 3e DLM, Zaloga seems to have missed the c. 60 Hotchkiss tanks of the 6th Light Mechanized Brigade of that division.

In the end there were not so many large scale duels between PzKpfw IVs  and Char B1 bis. That is not so surprising, after all in 1940 PzKpfw IV was a support tank providing 75mm HE firesupport to lighter tanks, of which those armed with 37mm tank guns were meant to handle enemy tanks. To me the most interesting part of the book is the description of Char B1 bis and some info on the level of combat readiness of the DCRs at the eve of German attack. The book is good and well worth of having. While the Battle of Stonne was very bloody and hard and in a way important because it was fought to secure the southern “shoulder” of German deep penetration at Sedan, it wasn’t a classic tank battle, much of its outcome depended on infantry and artillery. But Capitaine Billotte’s attack in his Char B1 bis through Stonne is reminiscent of Wittmann’s attack to Villers-Bocage. Of course Wittmann’s attack had clearly bigger impact on the overall situation and Billotte came back in his tank, not on foot like Wittmann. Because there were not many large scale battles in which Char B1 bises participated to choose from and if Char B1 bis is to be the other participant of the duel the choice of the battle of Stonne is OK.  The Battle of Flavion was probably the largest of those and it was fought on a good tank terrain but of course there the French were handicapped by the fact that their tanks were low in fuel when Germans attacked. And Zaloga gives a short description of that battle, too. IMHO the best example of tank duels in May – June 1940 would have been Panzer III vs SOMUA S35 with the focus on the greatest tank battle to date, that fought around Hannut in Belgium on 12–14 May 1940. It was a meeting engagement between the 2e and 3e Divisions Légère Mécanique and the 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions.

And thanks to my brother for lending his copy of Zaloga's book.

Forczyk’s book is IMHO good. For its size it gives a good background information, describes enough the actions and gives good overview on the importance of Focke-Wulf Fw 200C to the Battle of Atlantic and reasons for its early successes and its ultimate failure against Allied convoys. The two maps convey very well the essentials of Condors’ anti-convoy operations and the four tables are clear and convey well the essential information as do the diagrams on anti-aircraft systems of armed merchant ships  and low-level attack  tactic used by Condors. But there is at least one mistake in the table “Condor losses by cause”. The 3rd column header “AA from land/merchant ship” should be “AA from merchant ship/ land” or the numbers in the column should be reversed.

Typically to Duel series there is chronology and two minibiographies, that of Edgar Petersen, quite self-evident choice and that of Eric Brown, the very famous test pilot, maybe not so self-evident choice but Brown was one of the Martlet pilots on the Royal Navy’s  first escort carrier HMS Audacity whole of its short career and claimed two Fw 200 Condors. And the arrival of escort carriers was really the turning point  in the Fw 200 Condors vs Atlantic convoys battle.

Forczyk is more in home with Condor than with Royal Navy's  weapon systems. Contrary what Forczyk writes, 12pdr(3”) wasn’t the main heavy AA gun of Royal Navy in 30s, 4” was and at the end of decade 4.5” dual purpose gun had entered  in service. 12pdr might be the most common heavy AA gun installed onto merchant vessels during the WWII but that is a different thing.  And the rate of fire wasn’t the main problem of 2pdr pom-pom besides the unreliability of early versions, it wasn’t significantly lower than that of excellent 40mm Bofors, but the fairly low muzzle velocity of the pom-pom was.

The Royal Navy had begun to understand the need for anti-aircraft protection of Great Britain’s merchant shipping by late 30s and sloops constructed in late 30s had powerful AA armament. Bittern-class sloops, 2 of the 3 ships had six 4" AA guns (3x2), HACS AA fire control director, four .5" AA guns (1x4) and Egret-class sloops, 3 ships, 8 x 4-inch AA guns (4x2), Fuze Keeping Clock AA fire control system, 4 x .5-inch AA (1x4) were commissioned 1936 – 39 and just nearing completion were first of the  Black Swans, 12 were launched between 1939 and 1943, including four for the Royal Indian Navy; twenty-five Modified Black Swans were launched between 1942 and 1945, including two for the Royal Indian Navy. Their armament was 6 × QF 4 in (102 mm) Mk XVI AA guns (3 × 2), Fuze Keeping Clock AA fire control system, 4 × 2pdr AA pom-pom plus 4 × 0.5-inch (12.7 mm) AA machine guns (original), 12 × 20 mm Oerlikon AA (6 × 2) (modified). The first of Black Swans was commissioned on 3 November 1939 and the second on 27 January 1940 and 3 more during the first part of 41, i.e. at the height of the Condor menace.

Also there were the Hunts of which 19 were commissioned in 1940. They were modeled on the 1938 escort sloop Bittern. The Hunt class was to ship the same armament of three twin Mark XIX mounts for the QF 4-inch (102 mm) gun Mark XVI. The guns were controlled by a Fuze Keeping Clock AA fire control computer when engaging aircraft plus a quadruple QF 2 pounder mount Mark VII. While sloops were restricted to speeds under 20knots by a treaty Hunts were small destroyers with top speed of 27 knots (50 km/h). The first twenty were ordered in March and April 1939. They were constructed to Admiralty standards, as were contemporary destroyers, unlike the frigates which conformed much more to mercantile practice. The demanding specifications in an overworked Admiralty design department resulted in a major design miscalculation. When the detailed calculations were done the centre of gravity was lower than expected and the beam was increased. As the first ships were being completed it was found that the design was as much as 70 tons overweight, top heavy, leaving them dangerously deficient in stability. The first twenty ships were so far advanced in construction that it was necessary to remove the 'X' 4 inch mount and add 50 tons of permanent ballast. These ships became the Type I group, and had the multiple 2 pounder gun relocated from behind the funnel to the more advantageous 'X' position. The design deficiency of the Type I was rectified by splitting the hulls lengthwise and adding a 2½ foot section, increasing the beam and the margin of stability sufficiently for the designed armament to be shipped. These ships became the Type II group. Under the 1939 Emergency War Programme 36 more Hunts had been ordered: three of these were completed to the original (Type I) design.

The main problem for the RN was that the unexpected collapse of France and occupation of Norway by Germany not only opened opportunity for Condors to attack against southern convoy routes but also allowed medium-bomber anti-shipping attacks in Irish Sea and in the waters around Ireland, so these ships were urgently needed besides the North Sea also in this new danger area.

Analyze seems otherwise good, but near the end the 20mm Oerlikon fixation goes to annoying dimensions. Even after Forczyk has told that the more powerful anti-aircraft protection of convoys had forced KG 40 to abandon the low-level attacks and with the new Fw 200C-4 version, which was equipped with the good Lofte 7B bombsight, it began to bomb from 3,000m (10,000ft) to avoid light automatic AA fire, he still regard the number of Oerlikons as measurement of how good AA defense a convoy had.

Another small error in the book is that the first escort carrier with a hangar deck wasn’t HMS Biter but both HMS Archer and HMS Avenger  had begun to escort convoys already during the spring 1942.

In spite of some errors the book is a good introduction to Fw 200 Condor and its use as maritime bomber and reconnaissance bomber and the Allied efforts to combat this menace.