96 pages

The book begins with a short but interesting development history of the Pe-2. Interesting and to me new information on how Petlyakov got arrested in autumn 1937 and how long he resisted his interrogators before cracking and confessing his ‘anti-Soviet crimes’.

Then the story of how Petlyakov and his team designed the high altitude fighter/fighter-bomber ‘100’ while serving their time in the special prison, Special Technical Department of the NKVD. The plane was later radically redesigned to the dive-bomber PB-100, later re-designated as Pe-2. Also new to me was the information that the German air raids during summer of 1941 had effect on Pe-2 production. 

The authors go briefly through the main modifications of the Pe-2. One notice, KlimovM-105R vs PF, the poorer high altitude performance of the latter was the result not only of the poorer propeller efficiency but also of the lower full throttle height. According the authors the last big change to production Pe-2s was the changing of the shape of the leading edge of the outer wing section at the very end of 1944. My other Pe-2 sources say that these charges, designed Pe-2B, tested on Pe-2 c/n 19-223 and 14-226, were proved beneficial especially during take-off and landing, making them clearly easier and safer but because of the strong demand of Pe-2s it was decided not to disturb production by new outer wings and so the change was not implemented into production aircraft.

The combat descriptions are based predominantly only on Soviet information, but sometimes the authors has checked it against information from German documents. While I hope that authors would use sources of both sides so that readers would learn what really happened in this case the authors at least clearly state when given information is based solely on Soviet documents which is good and fair. And as said sometimes they give both the Soviet losses and claims and also the German claims and losses based on the information from German documents.

The 17 pages long Guards Bomber Air Regiments chapter is a bit list-like, but that is not surprising because the authors go through the combat histories of eight regiments. But it still shows how heavy and costly the first months, in fact even the first one and a half years of the Great Patriotic War were for the Soviet bomber units. E.g. 31st SBAP (later redesignated as 4th GvBAP), even if it dispersed all its SB bombers on the evening of 21 June 1941 and so none of its bombers was destroyed on the ground during Luftwaffe bombing raids the following morning, lost 88 percent of its original strength of 59 aircraft in less than a month. Of course also many successful operations are mentioned.

Interesting to note how effective the bombing attacks on Soviet airfields by the Luftwaffe were in Far North during the first couple months of the war when one thinks how meagre resources the Luftwaffe had there and they had no advance of surprise because the weather was very poor there during the first week of the Operation Barbarossa. The first attack on airfields was made on 23 June 1941 but only with two Ju 88s. I had seen the German claims earlier but because bomber crews often reported very optimistic results it is nice to have info on the real results.

On the page 17 “the port town of Vyborg and the railway station at Vipuri”, the latter should be Viipuri, and it is the Finnish name of the city which Russians call Vyborg.

The Mannerheim Line had been the main defensive line of the Finns during the Winter War (30 Nov. 1939 – 13 March 1940) but Soviets had blown up all those its bunkers that had not been destroyed during the fighting immediately after capturing them in mid-February 1940, so it did not have any significant defensive importance in 1944. The Finns’ main defensive line in Karelian Isthmus in 1944 was based on field fortifications because it was also the front line. Authors probably mean the VT-Line, which was Finns’ second defence line in 1944. It was partially completed line of permanent fortifications. But it was manned entirely by Finns. German reinforcements (a Sturmgeschütz-Brigade and an infantry division) arrived only after Soviets had broken through the VT-Line and conquered Viipuri/Vyborg.

On the bombing of the railway yards of Viipuri/Vyborg. The biggest attack was done by the ADD (Soviet long-range Air Force, their Bomber Command so to speak) when 142 of its planes bombed Viipuri during the night 14/15 June 1944 but the worst damage was achieved on 15 June, when 72 aircraft (Pe-2s, Il-4s and escort fighters) attacked on Maaskola railway yard at Viipuri/Vyborg and Karjala suburb, two ammunition trains were hit and began explode at Maaskola railway yard causing extensive damage. According to Inozemtsev, the 34th GvBAP (Guards Bomber Air Regiment) participated amongst others the quite an effective 17 June attack on Maaskola railway yard. It also made a rather ineffective, contrary to what crews reported, attack on Hovinmaa station on 19 June, the through pair of tracks was broken but it was repaired quickly. Only other results were a few damaged wooden houses and one wounded. And it seems that it participated the very effective raid on Elisenvaara railway yard on 20 June. There almost all of the tracks in the yard were damaged, only one thorough pair of tracks remained intact, 38  railway carriages and a couple engines were more or less damages, 167 people were killed, mostly civilians.
There were also other effective Pe-2 strikes in Finland during the June 1944 e.g. on 20 June bombing of Kirkonmaa which destroyed a mine depot, German mine transport ship ‘Otter’, two mine barges and eight motorboats. 

In the 13 pages long Guards Bomber Air Division chapter there are more descriptions of individual missions, both very successful and very costly ones and the developments of tactics used to reduce losses and increase effectiveness. But there were only two Pe-2 equipped Guards Bomber Air Division.

The authors explain the formation of the ‘punishment squadrons’ and their intended use. The punishments were much harsher with the Soviet and German armed forces than with the Western ones. And the battles on the Eastern front were bitterer.

I was surprised to learn that a recce squadron under 204th BAD (Bomber division) was still equipped with Su-2s in January 1943, then I remembered that while the type was at least mostly withdrawn from bomber and ground attack units by then it was still at that time used as a reconnaissance aircraft.

The massive attack by 3rd GvBAD on a German airfield on 14 September 1943 which according to Soviet intelligence information destroyed 50-55 German combat aircraft on Borovsk airfield (according to the caption on page 45) or on the airfield at Vorovsoye (according to the text on page 46) and according to the authors based on on German reports the Stukageschwader operating from the airfield temporarily lost its combat capability after as many as 20 of its Ju 87s were destroyed. Probably the unit hit was II./St.G. 1 which lost according to de Zeng IV and Stankey on the ground at Shatalovka-East airfield five Ju 87 Ds destroyed, seven more severely damaged and seven more moderately damaged and this reduced the Gruppe to the strength of a single Staffel. A loss of 20 planes did not usually made a circa 100 planes strong Geschwader inoperative but would critically weakened circa 33 aircraft strong Gruppe. Identifying places in ex-Soviet Union is sometimes difficult because Germans and Soviets sometimes used different names on certain locations and many places were renamed after fallen heroes after liberation.

Ps. I found out that I have more information on this attack.
Laurent Rizzotti 14th September 2009 16:31     Re: Soviet raid on Schatalowka airfield, 14 September 1943
 
Thanks Larry, that made the location of the action far clearer to me (and also explains why the two airfields were attacked at the same time, being only some km apart).

By the way I found on another Russian site a list of aircraft destroyed on the ground during this raid:
1./JG54   FW190A WNr 7053 - 20%
5./JG54   FW190A WNr 1092 - 30%
12./JG54  FW190A WNr 7277 - 100%
NAGr4    Bf109G-6 WNr 26006 - 40%; WNr 15891 - 10%; Bf108 WNr 2011 - 20%
II./StG1   Ju87D-3 WNr 1178 & 110865 - both 100%; WNr 110804 - 90%; WNr 110754 - 50%; WNr
          2675 – 40%; WNr 1241, 110036 & 110514 - all 20%
          Ju87D-5 WNr 130850, 130666 & 130761 - all 100%; WNr 130673 - 80%; WNr 130671 &                130670 - both 60%; WNr 130659 & 130851 - both 50%; WNr 130662 - 15%; WNr 130667 &              130672 - both 10%

So that made 10 aircraft destroyed/damaged beyond repair and 15 other damaged, not too bad.
The source: http://www.airwar.ru/history/av2ww/axis/germloss4/germloss9.html 

This information is from http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/showthread.php?t=18216

The chapter Guards Bomber Air Corps is also 13 pages long. The first one and a third pages of the chapter in fact tells the story of Aviation Armies, naturally mostly the 1st Bomber Aviation Army. When these were found too cumbersome it was decided to form less cumbersome Reserve Air Corps and 1st Bomber Aviation Army became 1st Bomber Air Corps (BAK) in September 1942 and became 2nd GvBAK on 5 February 1944. Again besides information on selected missions, both very successful and exceptionally costly, also on improvements in tactics. The other Guards Bomber Air Corps was 1st GvBAK, originally 2nd BAK which was formed October/November 1942 and became Guards formation on 3 September 1943. The famous 587th Women’s SBAP had became a seventh regiment of 2nd BAK by the end of 1942. At the end of June 1944 1st GvBAK was redesignated as 5th GvBAK in order to avoid numerical duplication as ADD merges with the VVS RKKA.

Next there is 16 pages of information on the guards reconnaissance units, reconnaissance was and is an important part of the aerial activity which often does not get the attention it deserves in aviation literature.

On the attack on Idriza airfield on 27 February 1944. On the Luftwaffe units based on Idritsa/Idriza airfield according to Henry L. deZeng IV; its anti-aircraft defence consisted only elements of gem.Flak-Abt. 294 at that time. So maybe the reports of dozens of flak batteries were exaggerating. What AA defences the nearby station and the town of Idritsa itself had I don’t know. Of the flying units based there 1. /Nahaufklärungsgruppe 5 had no losses in February 1944, 2./Nahaufklärungsgruppe 5 lost one Bf 109 G-6/U3 as destroyed or badly damaged by enemy action in February 1944 and sent one to overhaul. 1.(H)/Aufklärungsgruppe 31 lost one Fw 189 A-2 destroyed or badly damaged by enemy action in February 1944 and sent two to overhaul. I have no information of the possible losses of Nachtschlachtgruppe 1 but anyway it was not yet using Ju 87s but still using normal NSGr equipment, He 46s, Ar 66s etc.  According to Arro  Nachtschlachtgruppe 11 (estnisch) had left the airfield in early February 1944.
On the Ju 87 units of Luftflotte 1. I./SG 3 was based in February 1944 at Tartu/Dorpat, appr. 265 km NNW of Idriza. It lost (destroyed or badly damaged) in February 1944 five Ju 87 Ds because of enemy actions. 
II./SG 3 was based in February 1944 at Pskov/Pihkova appr. 170 km north of Idriza. It lost (destroyed or badly damaged) two Ju 87 Ds because of enemy actions in February 1944 and sent five other to overhaul. 
I./SG 5 was based in February 1944 at Korowje-Selo, 145 km north of Idriza and in February 1944 it lost (destroyed or badly damaged) three Ju 87 Ds because of enemy actions.
For the Germans Idriza airfield was a field airstrip (Feldflugplatz).

Not mentioned in the book but for comparison and because one Pe-2 guards unit mentioned in the book participated in it. On 2 July 1944, at Lappeenranta the attacking force consisted of 16 Pe-2s from 34th GvBAP and 36 Il-2s plus fighter escorts. Finns lost on ground two Bf 109 Gs and two war-booty Pe-2s and two Bf 109 Gs were so badly damaged that their repairs were completed only after the Continuation War. In this case Pe-2s dive bombed. At Immola, where Luftwaffe Gefechtsverband Kuhlmey was based, 44 Pe-2s made a level bombing attack and 28 Il-2s low-level attack. There three Finnish Brewster 239s were lost when a maintenance hangar was hit and burned. Germans lost nine planes: 4 Ju 87 Ds and 6 Fw 190s, and 15 of their other planes were very badly damaged, two less so and seven suffered only minor damage. In both cases bombing was accurate. At Immola the attack was more successful because the very well and cleverly planned attack using a feint and very carefully planned approach routes achieved complete surprise, only two of II./JG 54 Focke-Wulf Fw 190 As got airborne before Soviet planes attacked. So Il-2s could make three attacks. At Lappeenranta most of Finnish Bf 109 Gs were already airborne when Soviet attack force arrived and they began engage Il-2s during their first attack and so prevented any follow-up attacks.

While writing on the Lvov–Sandomierz Offensive the authors make overstatements. Army Group North Ukraine was forced to retreat but the fighting was hard and both sides suffered heavy losses, so it was not complete routed and while it lost, besides other losses, most of its XIII Corps in the Brody encirclement, it did not ceased to exist, it was simply renamed to Army Group A, probably mainly because it was mostly pushed out from Ukraine, northern half of it was fighting west of the Curzon Line, so definitely in Poland and the southern part on the north-eastern slopes of the Carpathians, so still just inside pre-1938 Poland or post-1945 Ukraine.

The last chapter is eight page long Guards Bomber Air Regiments of Naval Air Forces. The account of 73rd BAP KBF (later 12th GvBAP KBF), KBF = Soviet Baltic Fleet, attacks on the Narva railway bridge reminded me that I read decades ago a report of the Finnish liaison officer at the HQ of the Luftflotte 1 which informed the Finnish Air Force HQ of a German warning that the Soviet Air Force had several highly skilled units that could execute well planned and highly effective strikes, one example given was a cleverly and skilfully executed dive bombing attack on an important bridge somewhere in Baltic States. IIRC the attack began with low level attack, probably by Il-2s, against the bridge and the AA positions. When AA crews were distracted by this a sudden dive-bomber attack destroyed/badly damaged the bridge.

On the sinking of German 4,030 t, not 6,000 t as claimed in the caption of the front cover, AA ship (Schwimmende Flakbatterie / Flakschiff) Niobe in the port of Kotka on 16 July 1944. The high command of the Soviet Baltic Fleet Air Force was certain that Niobe would in fact be the Finnish coastal defence ship Väinämöinen, which has the displacement of 3,900 t, so it was almost the same size and sent a massive air group of 132 or 133 planes to sink it. The attack was well planned and executed and Niobe was sunk. According to Finns and some Soviet/Russian sources it was the four very low flying A-20Gs from the 51st Mine-Torpedo Aviation Regiment of the Baltic Fleet Air Force which achieved the fatal hits with two 1000 kg bombs. According to Kotelnikov and pseudonym Warjag at www.forum-marinearchiv.de Niobe was hit by two FAB-250s and two FAB-1000s. The former were dropped by Pe-2s and the latter by Bostons.  Niobe, ex- Gelderland, was originally a Dutch protected cruiser, not a coastal defence destroyer, the term used by the authors it the text, Finnish Väinämöinen was a coastal defence ship, a kind of mini-battleship. While in the authors used the right term on Väinämöinen in the text and the caption of the cover image, in the caption on the page 84 the term coastal defence destroyer is used. 

The authors also give three pages long description of the Operation Arcturus which consisted five big raids by the Baltic Fleet Air Force against the port of Liepaja/Libau in October and December 1944. Liepaja was the main supply port for the isolated German Army Group North, later renamed as AG Kurland. The description includes German defences, Soviet preparations, the Soviet planes participating the raid on 30 October, a recollection of one Soviet pilot of the 22 December raid, the number of German fighters usually participating the defence, German fighter pilots claims versus the real Soviet losses during a couple raids etc. There is also a table showing for each raid the number of Soviet aircraft participating, how many of these were Pe-2s or Il-2s, the total number of Soviet aircraft lost and the number of German ships claimed sunk. After the table in the text the results according to Germans.

The authors give a brief descriptions of the main organizational changes with the Soviet air forces and the beginning of the tradition of awarding the title of Guards units to combat units after a success in battle in September 1941. The first six aviation units were awarded the title on 6 December 1941.

One piece of Interesting information is that members of Guards units got 1½ - 2 fold increase in their financial allowances.

Many interesting but small photographs with informative captions. There are also a couple wartime instructional drawings on tactics used by Pe-2 units.

30 colour profiles by Andrey Yurgenson with several camo patterns and with interesting individual markings in ten cases.

There is one appendix in the book, Scheme of Pe-2 Guards units transition. It shows when units got their guards status, old and new unit designations and if the unit was formed after the beginning of the Great Patriotic war, 22 June 1941, roughly when it was formed. I did not check the table but noticed that of the naval units, in the table 34th Guards BAP previous designation is given as 34th BAP Baltic Fleet Air Force but in the text as 34th BAP of the Air Forces of the Pacific Fleet and that it stayed a part of that throughout the WW2.

In the book there are the following scale drawings: a 3-view of Pe-2 18th series, a 2-view of Pe-2R based on the 110th series and a side view of Pe-2R based on the 83rd series. And also an index, not all-encompassing but reasonably comprehensive.

So a good nice book on its subject, worth getting. The authors give numerous times the number of sorties, the amount of bombs dropped, the number of planes and aircrews lost and claimed results during the given timeframe by the given unit or formation.


Sources:
Sota-arkisto T 19280/49 Yhteysupseerien raportit LFl. 5 ja LFl. 1 22.06.41-27.12.42

Andersson, Lennart, Soviet Aircraft and Aviation 1917 – 1941 (London: Putnam Aeronautical Books,
     reprinted (with additions) 1997).
Arro, Hendrik, Viron lentäjät taistelujen tulessa (Helsinki: Vehari Oy, 1999).
Geust, Carl-Fredrik, ’Neuvostoliiton kaukotoimintailmavoimat kesän 1944 suurhyökkäyksessä Karjalan
     kannaksella’, English summary ’The Soviet Long-range Air Force During the Great Offensive on the
     Karelian Isthmus in Summer 1944’, Sotahistoriallinen aikakauskirja 23 (2004) pp. 143 – 158.
Gordon, Yefim, Soviet Air Power in World War 2 (Hinckley: Midland Publishing, 2008).
Gordon, Yefim and Khazanov, Dmitri, Soviet Combat Aircraft of the Second World War. Volume Two
    (Leicester: Midland Publishing, 1999).
Gordon, Yefim and Komissarov, Sergey, Ilyushin Il-2 and Il-10 Shturmovik (Ramsbury: Crowood Press, 2004).
Haapanen, Atso, Kesäsota . Suomen ilmavoimien sotalennot kesällä 1944 (Tampere: Apali, 2006).
Inozemtsev, I. G., Karjalan kannaksen yllä, operaation aattona 1944, suomeksi kääntänyt: Paavo        Kajakoski  http://www.virtualpilots.fi/hist/WW2History-punanakokulma_kannaksenylla4.html extracted on        15 November 2004.
Kauranen, Heikki and Vesen, Jukka, Simolan pommitukset 19. – 20.6.1944 (Tampere: Apali, 2006).
Khazanov, Dmitriy B., Air War Over Kursk. Turning Point in the East (Bedford: SAM Publications, 2010).
Kotelnikov, Vladimir, Lend-Lease and Soviet Aviation in the Second World War (Solihull: Helion, 2007).
Kuusela, Kari, Wehrmachtin panssarit Suomessa. Saksalaiset panssariyksiköt Suomessa 1941 – 1944. Panzer
     units in Finland 1941 – 1944 (Helsinki: Wiking-Divisioona, 2000).
Lappi, Ahti, ’Viipurin ilmatorjunta’, Eero Elfvengren, Eeva Tammi (toim.) Viipuri 1944 (Helsinki: WSOY).
Manninen, Pentti, ‘2.7.1944: Lappeenrannan lentokentän pommitus, Suomen Ilmailuhistoriallinen Lehti 
     2/2001 pp. 8 – 13.
Smith, Peter C., Petlyakov Pe-2 ’Peshka’ (Ramsbury: Crowood Press, 2003).
Stapfer, Hans-Heiri, Petlyyakov Pe-2 in action Aircraft Number 181 (Carrollton, Texas: squadron/signal, 2002).
Valtonen, Hannu, Luftwaffen Pohjoinen Sivusta (Jyväskylä: Keski-Suomen Ilmailumuseo, 1997).
de Zeng IV, Henry L. and Stankey, Douglas G., Dive-bomber and Ground-attack Units of the Luftwaffe 1933-
     1945 Volume 1 (Hersham: Ian Allan, 2009).
Henry L. deZeng IV, Luftwaffe Airfields 1935-45 Russia (incl. Ukraine, Belarus & Bessarabia)
     https://ww2.dk/Airfields%20-%20Russia%20and%20Ukraine.pdf  extracted on 28 September 2020.
Henry L. deZeng IV, Luftwaffe Airfields 1935-45 The Baltic States – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
     http://www.ww2.dk/Airfields%20-%20Baltic%20States%20-%20Estonia,%20Latvia%20and%20Lithuania.pdf 
     extracted on 12 December 2020.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=65762&highlight=niobe extracted on 20 October 2012.
http://www.netherlandsnavy.nl/Gelderland.htm  extracted on 26 July 2010.
http://www.german-navy.de/kriegsmarine/ships/aabattery/niobe/history.html  extracted on 26 July 2010.
https://www.flightforum.fi/topic/30561-douglas-a-20-havoc-l%C3%B6ytynyt/   extracted on 11 October 2019.
https://www.forum-marinearchiv.de/smf/index.php?topic=1095.15  extracted on 4 December 2020.
http://www.kurkijoki.fi/kylat/elisen03/elis_v_pomm.html extracted on 11 November 2019.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sukhoi_Su-2  extracted on 11 September 2020.
http://www.ww2.dk/air/attack/stg1.htm  extracted on 14 May 2011.
http://www.ww2.dk/oob/bestand/stuka/bststg1.html  extracted on 14 May 2011.
http://www.ww2.dk/oob/bestand/stuka/bistg1.html  extracted on 14 May 2011.
http://www.ww2.dk/oob/bestand/stuka/biistg1.html  extracted on 14 May 2011.
http://www.ww2.dk/oob/bestand/stuka/biiistg1.html  extracted on 14 May 2011.
http://www.ww2.dk/air/attack/stg2.htm  extracted on 23 June 2011.
http://www.ww2.dk/air/attack/stg77.htm  extracted on 1 October 2017.
https://ww2.dk/Airfields%20-%20Russia%20and%20Ukraine.pdf  extracted on 28 September 2020.
http://www.ww2.dk/Airfields%20-%20Baltic%20States%20-%20Estonia,%20Latvia%20and%20Lithuania.pdf 
     extracted on 12 December 2020.
https://ww2.dk/air/recon/nagr5.htm  extracted on 28 September 2020.
https://ww2.dk/oob/bestand/aufkl/bstnagr5.html  extracted on 28 September 2020.
https://ww2.dk/oob/bestand/aufkl/b1nagr5.html  extracted on 28 September 2020.
https://ww2.dk/oob/bestand/aufkl/b2nagr5.html  extracted on 28 September 2020.
https://ww2.dk/air/attack/nsgr11.htm  extracted on 28 September 2020.
https://www.ww2.dk/oob/bestand/aufkl/b1ag31.html  extracted on 28 September 2020.
http://www.ww2.dk/oob/bestand/jagd/bstjg54.html  extracted on 2 March 2009.
http://www.ww2.dk/oob/bestand/jagd/bijg54.html  extracted on 22 March 2009.
http://www.ww2.dk/oob/bestand/jagd/biijg54.html  extracted on 29 April 2013.

Khazanov, Dmitriy & Medved, Aleksander, Bf 109E/F vs Yak-1/7 Eastern Front 1941 – 42 Osprey Duel 65 (2015) 80 pages, ISBN: 978 1 4728 0579 9

The book was a bit disappointment. It has its good points and generally while the situation is much improved since 1980s there is still lack of books on the Soviet side of the Great Patriotic War as they call the WWII on the Eastern Front from 22 June 1941 onwards. The book shows that while Yak-1 or Yak-7 were not in par with Bf 109F-4, IMHO the best short-range fighter in the world from mid-1941 to mid-1942, they were good, if somewhat rudimentary equipped low- and medium altitude fighters during that timeframe.

The book gives as usual in this series the basic information on the versions of Yaks and Bf 109 up to mid-1942, the strategic background and the pilot training, combat tactics and organization of the respective air forces. The biographs given are those of Mikhail Dmitrievich Baranov, an ace with 24 individual aerial victories and Hermann Graf, 206 aerial victories according the book, 212 aerial victories according to the most sources I have seen, e.g. Bergström et. al. Graf biography and http://www.luftwaffe.cz/graf.html . There is empty space worth of 15 lines on the page allocated to the Graf’s biography which could have been easily filled by more facts from Graf’s long combat career and e.g. his father’s occupation, he was a farmer, later a baker who served as an artilleryman during the WWI, not simply an artilleryman as given in the bio. And while JG(r) 50 was a specialist unit JG 11 wasn’t. The book illustrated some battle formations used by the VVS KA (the Soviet Army Air Force), they were standard “vic” based formations used rather universally before a pair and its multitudes became the new norm. The Combat part is somewhat vague but includes some interesting quotes from pilots’ memoirs.

On the pages 58 – 59 there is a good analyse on the problems faced by the Soviet fighter formation leaders during the early part of the Great Patriotic War; lack of radios, poor communications generally, too strict orders which limited formation leaders initiative, obsolete formations etc. But I doubt the claim that Soviet fighters were invariably being outnumbered even in the initial stages of the fighting on the Eastern Front, front was simply so long and there were too few German fighters to give adequate cover to everywhere along it.

The authors give as the total number of Bf 109s ranged against the Soviet Union as approximate 820, not much over the usually given figure of 793 single-engine fighters of which 619 were serviceable.

There are three maps on pages 36, 40 and 41. The first one gives information on the Luftwaffe and VVS KA (Army Air Forces) fighter strengths on the eve of the Operation Barbarossa on the very early morning of 22 June 1941 on the Eastern Front from the Gulf of Finland to the Black Sea. The number of VVS KA fighters, 4,226 is smaller than that given in Tomasz Kopanski’s Barbarossa Victims on page 13, namely 4 730. On the other hand, the number of Bf 109s readying to attack the Soviet Union is given as 824 which is a little more than 793 given in Balke’s and Bergström’s books. The number of Yak-1s given is identical in both this and Kopanski’s book. The second map shows the Soviet fighter units in the Moscow area on 30 October 1941. Based on my very limited sources of Soviet air forces it seems that some of the 6 IAK (fighter corps) Moscow Region PVO fighter units are left out, e.g. 16 and 34 IAPs equipped with MiG-3s. The map reveals the bases used and the fighter regiments and also shows which fighter regiments had Yak-1s in their strengths but doesn’t give any strength figures for the Soviet units shown. The last one gives the disposition of the VVS-KA fighter units in the Stalingrad region in October 1942, giving the number of Yaks and the identity of the IAPs (fighter regiments) for each IAD and SAD (fighter and mixed air divisions) in the region. Also given is the number of Bf 109s in the region (both Bf 109F-4s of the JG 3 and the Bf 109E-7/Us of the SchG 1). The number of  Bf 109 fighters is correct but according to the Michael Holm’s site (http://www.ww2.dk/air/jagd/jg3.htm etc.), most were in fact Bf 109G-2s, only III./JG 3 was still equipped with Bf 109F-4s. This is confirmed in the Prien’s & Stemmer’s Jagdgeschwader 3 “Udet” in World War II multivolume unit history. I./Sch.G.1 had exactly 28 Bf 109E-7/U-1s on 31.10.1942 plus Stab/Sch.G.1 had five more and on 1 October they have had 22+3 Bf 109E-7/U-1s according to Michael Holm’s site. So one can say that the number of Bf 109s given is the correct one but most of the fighters were in fact already Bf 109G-2s and F-4s were already a minority.

But the book has its problems. It is a bit misleading to compare the number of Bf 109s with the number of Yaks in service because in 1941 Bf 109 was the only single engine fighter in service with the Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front while Soviet air forces had, besides the huge number of older fighters, three types of modern single engine fighters in service. The most numerous of these in June 1941 was the MiGs, around 1,000 in service compared to 200+ Yak-1s. Those LaGG-3s which were with first–line units were with Moscow and Leningrad PVOs or in Far East. I don’t have exact number of LaGG-3s with first-line units, but the number of the modern single-engine fighters produced by 22 June 1941 was 2,030 (1,309 MiGs, 399 Yak-1s and 322 LaGG-3s). And even during the last six months of 1941 both MiG-3 and LaGG-3 productions were twice as high as the Yak production. Only in 1942 Yak became the most produced Soviet single engine fighter.

Bf 109E-3 was powered by a DB 601 A, not by a DB 601Aa.

On p. 22 there is a typo and a mistake in the last chapter, M-105P/PA produced 1,100 metric hp/ps/л.с. (1,085 hp) at 2,000 m alt. and 1,050 metric hp/ps/л.с. (1,036 hp) at 4000 metres. M-105PF produced 1,260 hp/ps/л.с. (1,243 hp) at 700 m, 1,180 hp/ps/л.с. (1,164 hp) at 2700 metres. So the full throttle/rated altitudes were lower than claimed in the book.

In Bf 109Fs its 7.92 mm MG 17s had 500 rpg, not 300 claimed in the book. Probably the error is because from Bf 109G-5/-6 onwards the two MG 17s with 500 rpg were replaced by two 13 mm MG 131s with 300 rpg.

The maximum speed of Bf 109F-4. The DB 601 E was initially restricted to 1,200 PS (1,184 hp) at 2,500 rpm; however, the full rating of 1,350 PS (1,332 hp) at 2,700 rpm (Start und Not that means Take-off and Emergency, allowed only for a short duration of 3 minutes) was cleared for service use by February 1942. With 1,184 hp Climb and Combat power maximum speed of a Bf 109F-4 was 660 km/h at 6,200 m according to the Datenblatt  109 F4 Augsburg, den 29.11.41. I don’t know if the speed is with or without compressibility correction, often German performance figures are given without compressibility correction. At that speed and altitude, the compressibility correction should IMHO reduce the attained speed about 15 km/h. In this case I think that the figure is without the compressibility correction because the maximum speed with 1,184 hp Climb and Combat power was given as 635 km/h at 6,000 m in the Datenblatt  109 F4 Augsburg, den 1.7.42. Anyway faster than 610 km/h given in the book and of course during 1942 even faster with Take-off and Emergency power, which gave extra 150 hp for maximum of 3 minutes. Also the ranges given to Bf 109 F-2 and F-4, 580 km and 560 km respectively, seems to be too short. A British test, dated 3rd Dec 1944, gave the maximum tactical range of Bf 109G (no information on subtype) with greater displacement DB 605 engine and the same amount of fuel as 615 mls/990 km without the 300 litres drop-tank and 1145 mls/1682 km with it. It also gives the fast cruise range of 450 mls/724 km without and 795 mls/1280 km with a drop-tank for the Bf 109G. Finnish experience was that the practical maximum range of Bf 109G-2/-6 was c. 750 km without a drop-tank because when flying lower, more economical speeds there were problems with spark plugs soothing and exhaust leakage into the cockpit. The Soviet data I have seen gives 650 km range for Bf 109F-4. Also the specification given in the table on the page to Yak-1b are the same but for the armament as given to normal high-back Yak-1 powered by a M-105PF tested at NII VVS in June 1942 in the Gordon’s book. According to Gordon Yak-1B was a bit lighter and 19 km/h faster than given in the table of this book. The information given on Yak-7B in the table and in Gordon’s book are almost identical.

On page 33 the ammunition load for the 20 mm MG 151/20 in Bf 109F-4 was given as 200 rounds. That is what could be loaded into a F-4 but at least Finns found out with their Bf 109Gs that the 200 rounds 20 mm belt was too heavy and often produced a breakage of the ammunition belt approximately halfway. When modifications didn’t eliminate the problem and Finns heard that Germans used to load their 109Gs only with approximately 130 rounds, Finns began to load the MG 151/20 of their 109Gs with 155 rounds (130 in the ammo box and 25 on the loading tray). Still more 20 mm rounds than in a Yak.
 
DB 605A engine didn’t immediately bring more power to Bf 109 because the use of the 1.42 ata boost which was needed for the 1,475 PS (1,455 hp) take-off and emergency power was banned most of the time up to autumn 1943, before that but some intervals maximum allowed boost was 1,30 ata producing maximum take-off power of 1,310 PS (1,292 hp). So at low and mid altitudes most of time before autumn 1943 Bf 109G had less power that Bf 109F-4 with heavier engine, only above circa 5,250 m DB 605A produced more power at 1.30 ata than DB 601E at 1.42 ata because the former had higher full throttle height but that was more important against the Western Allies than on the Eastern Front.

The book gives a bit too good picture on the pilot training in the Luftwaffe. Even if the Luftwaffe fighter pilots got some training on instrument flying, that wasn’t good enough for bad weather operations as the Luftwaffe learned in the West during the winter 1943/44.

On the page 43 the figure given as the Luftwaffe total losses between 1 May and 31 August 1942, 4,460 aircraft, is IMHO odd, the Quartermaster Generals Loss Returns gives the total losses of that time period as a little under 3,000 and that is the figure for all fronts plus a little under 2,400 damaged. According to Williamson Murray’s Luftwaffe p. 107 Table XXV, 53,7 % of the Luftwaffe total losses between 1 June and 31 August happened on the Eastern Front.  So the figure in the book doesn’t seem to fit the information from the Quartermaster Generals Loss Returns and Murray’s book. It may well be that the authors had access to better sources than I but according to the sources I have access the figure seems odd.  And the number given as the number of German single-engine fighters in the frontline, 554, must be that of on the Eastern Front. A right figure but maybe the definition “on the Eastern Front” would have been nice to be added to that sentence.

On the page 52 the authors claim that ”The highest  homogenous tactical fighter unit was the Luftflotte. As a rule, every Luftflotte consisted of three combat geschwader, the Luftflotte HQ, a HQ detachment and a Communication Company…” I’m totally lost with that. To my understanding a Luftflotte was area based and was flexible in size and number of subordinated units, and its size changed depending on need. And it was heterogeneous, usually consisting fighter, bomber, reconnaissance etc. units. The main Luftflotten in the East in 1941 (1, 2 and 4) were all more powerful than three Geschwadern, 2 and 4 significantly so. And on 27 July 1942 Luftflotte 1 was about the size of three combat Geschwadern but Luftflotte 4 was massively more powerful, some 11(+) combat Geschwadern. Same to Luftflotte 2 in Mediterranean area (over six combat Geschwadern). In West Luftflotte 3 had almost worth of five combat Geschwadern.

While on the page 57 the numbering of the items in the Bf 109F-4 cockpit colour drawing is sequenced logically that isn’t the case in the Yak-1B cockpit colour drawing on the page 56. I notice that the clock is missing from the Bf 109F-4 cockpit colour drawing, should be in the right top corner.

On the page 70 the claim of 45th IAP seems odd if the date isn’t a typo. The text gives an impression that the regiment claimed eight Bf 109s while losing only a single Yak-1 on 11 July 1942 while part of the Sevastopol air group but most of the air group including all flyable fighters had been evacuated on the night of 30 June/1 July to Kuban and the city itself had fallen on 1 July and the last bigger Soviet formation had surrendered on 4 July even if some scattered resistance to the south of the city continued until 9 July. Or maybe that combat happened after the unit was evacuated from Sevastopol, but in that case it would have been nice to be told by the authors where the combat took place.

The information given in the table “Leading Yak-1/7 Bf 109 killers 1941 – 42” on the page 75 is different in several cases from that given by Mikhail Bykov. e.g. the scores of Sultan Amet-Khan and Schirov are somewhat different and there is bigger difference in I. I. Kleschev’s case, namely 16 individual + 15 shared vs 13 + 10 and in this book it is claimed that K. S. Alekseyev and M. Avdeyev/Advdeev served with the VVS of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet when in fact they served with the VVS of the Black Sea Fleet.

On Further Reading, almost all of the Russian books are unknown to me but according to my understanding Bykov’s book is highly regarded as are Prien’s JG 53 book and his, Stemmer’s, Rodeike’s and Bock’s Die Jagdfliegerverbande der Deutschen Luftwaffe series, even if the latter series is almost purely based on German documents and so has almost purely the German point of view. But I’m surprised that Nowarra’s (in the book typed as Novarra) Die 109 is in the list. IMHO it is obsolete and unreliable source. I have used Willy Radinger’s and Walter Schick’s Messerschmitt Me 109 Alle Varianten: von Bf (Me) 109A bis Me 109E (1997) for information on the early Bf 109 versions, on the later ones I have used a bit old Prien’s and Rodeike’s Messerschmitt Bf 109 F, G & K Series (1993). It doesn’t have specifications, so those I have usually checked from copies of documents and en.wikipedia pages, wiki’s Bf 109 pages are good ones.

IMHO the conclusions are mostly correct, the main problems of the VVS were inadequate training, organisational and control problems and obsolete combat tactics. Yaks, while not equal to Bf 109F-4 were still fairly well-matched to it at lower altitudes, which were the main combat altitude band on the Eastern Front, and had its strong points, e.g. being able to turn tighter. And as always in combat it was vital to try to use own strengths against opponent’s weaknesses.

Sources:
the Quartermaster Generals Loss Returns
Kennblatt für das Flugzeugmuster Bf 109 Baureihe F-1 und F-2 mit DB 601 N Motor Berlin 1941
Ladeplan Me 109 F-4/Z
Datenblatt  109 F4 Augsburg, den 29.11.41
Datenblatt  109 F4 Augsburg, den 1.7.42
L. Dv.T. 2109 F-2 und F-4/Wa Bf 109 F-2 und F-4 Bedienungsvorschrift - Wa

Balke, Ulf, Der Luftkrieg in Europa. Die operativen Einsätze des Kampfgeschwaders 2 im Zweiten Weltkrieg,
    Teil 1 (Koblenz: Bernard & Graefe , 1989).
Bergstrom, Christer, Barbarossa - The Air Battle: July–December 1941 (London: Chevron, 2007).
Bergström, Christer, Mikhailov, Andrey, Black Cross / Red Star Air War Over the Eastern Front, Volume 2,
    Resurgence January–June 1942 (Pacifica, California: Pacifica Military History, 2001).
Bergström, Christer, Antipov, Vlad, Sundin, Claes, Graf & Grislawski—A Pair of Aces (Hamilton MT: Eagle
    Editions, 2003).
Gordon, Yefim, Soviet Air Power in World War 2 (Hinckley: Midland Publishing, 2008).
Khazanov, Dmitriy and Medved, Aleksander, MiG-3 Aces of World War 2 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2012).
Kopanski, Tomasz, Barbarossa Victims. Luftwaffe kills in the East (Redbourn: Mushroom Model Publishing,
   2001).
Mellinger, George, LaGG and Lavochkin Aces of World War 2 (Oxford, Osprey Publishing, 2003).
Mellinger, George, Yakovlev Aces of World War 2 (Oxford, Osprey Publishing, 2005).
Murray, Williamson, Luftwaffe (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985).
Pitkänen, Mika ja Simpanen, Timo, 20 mm Suomessa - Aseet ja ampumatarvikkeet ennen vuotta 1945 / 20
    mm in Finland - Weapons and Ammunition prior to 1945 (Tampere: Apali, 2007).
Prien, Jochen & Stemmer, Gerhard, Jagdgeschwader 3 “Udet” in World War II Vol. I: Stab and I./JG3 in Action
   with the Messerschmitt Bf 109 (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing 2002).
Radinger, Willy and Schick, Walter, Messerschmitt Me 109: das meistgebaute Jagdflugzeug der Welt.
    Entwicklung, Erprobung und Technik. Alle Varianten:  von Bf (Me) 109A bis Me 109E (Oberhaching: Aviatic
    Verlag, 1997).
Raunio, Jukka, Lentäjän Näkökulma II (Kuorevesi: Jukka Raunio 1993).

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Messerschmitt_Bf_109_variants#E-3
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Messerschmitt_Bf_109_variants#Bf_109F
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Messerschmitt_Bf_109#Specifications_.28Bf_109_G-6.29
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hermann_Graf
http://www.luftwaffe.cz/graf.html
http://www.ww2.dk/air/jagd/jg3.htm
http://www.ww2.dk/oob/bestand/jagd/bstjg3.html
http://www.ww2.dk/oob/bestand/jagd/bijg3.html etc.
http://www.ww2.dk/air/attack/schg1.htm
http://www.ww2.dk/oob/bestand/schlacht/bstschg1.html
http://www.ww2.dk/oob/bestand/schlacht/bischg1.html
/results-of-the-soviet-turn-times-tests.html

A very good purchase, this collection of articles proceeds chronologically through the first part of the year 1945. 130 A-4 size pages. At first it gives the development of the situation in the autumn of 1944 followed by an article on the Operation Bodenplatte, the surprise attack against Allied airfields on January 1, 1945 by the Luftwaffe.

This  12 pages article is good but of course if one wants a definite account of the operation the real thing, Manhro’s and Pütz’ excellent Bodenplatte book is a must, but that is of course not surprising. The text is informative and the photos are well-chosen. The figures of the LW losses are clearly taken from Manhro’s and Pütz’ book but they are only partially given, the infomation that 47% of the LW losses were by Allied AA and 23% were by Allied fighters is only a partial truth because according to the Manhro’s and Pütz’ book in addition 5% of the losses were by either Allied AA or Allied fighters and 11% were to unknown causes. The German flak, contrary to the old myth, contributed only 5% of the German losses.

The story of the shooting down of three Mistels by four P-51 Mustangs from the 55th Fighter Group on Feb 3, 1945 is a good one. It gives besides the good information on the combat a brief history of the Mistel and the planned attack on Scapa Flow by Mistels and flare-dropping Ju 88s and 188s and the fates of the four Mustang pilots during the last few months of the war. Out of the four one was shot down by the deadly German Flak and went missing, possibly murdered by furious civilians, another became a prisoner of war when his attempt to rescue a friend downed by Flak failed and one was killed either because he stalled at low level or because of he was shot down by ground fire.

Squadron Leader Clive Rowley has written an interesting article on the Australian ace Tony Gaze’s life. While serving in the RAF Gaze got 1½ jet kills while flying Spitfire XIVs before being posted on May 1, 1945 to command ‘A’ Flight of 616 Squadron on Meteor III jets. Naturally the eight pages article concentrates on his combat career and its ups and downs. The only complain I have is that Me 262s of KG 51 is sometimes given as a Me 262 of JG 51, which is totally wrong, JG 51 was a conventional fighter unit equipped in 1944 – 45 with Bf 109Gs and fighting in the Eastern Front, the only exception was the IV./JG 51 which during the last month of the war was equipped with Fw 190s, before that it also had Bf 109Gs. Also the KG(J) 51,  which Rowley sometimes uses, is wrong, the unit was a bomber/fighter-bomber unit not a fighter unit formed out of a bomber unit. Rowley gives a different WNr. and code to Gaze’s Me 262 victim, 500064 and 9K+CL than John Foreman and S. E. Harvey in their a bit dated Me 262 Combat Diary, 110615 and 9K+NL but the unit and the pilot are same even if both give the unit designation wrongly. Smith and Creek agree with Foreman and Harvey in the WNr., they don’t give the code, and give the unit designation rightly. But Andreas Brekken’s/Aviation History Society Norway’s webpage agree with Rowley see http://www.ahs.no/ref_db/lw_loss_public.asp?lossid=103175, so while both Andreas and Smith & Creek are very good researchers in this case I tend to believe Andress in that at least in loss documents the WNr. and code is given as 500064 and 9K+CL.

The eight pages Natter article is very good.

Yaks over Köningsberg, the story of the French Normandie-Niemen fighter regiment operations over Kaliningrad area/East Prussia in the early part of 1945, pure chronology based only information from one side other than the OoB of the Luftwaffe’s Luftflotte 6 on the 11 January 1945. One notice on it, while it is true that ground-attack versions of Fw 190s could be used as pure fighters as the author writes they were handicapped by the weight of their extra armour. In the introduction part of the article unit’s pilot losses during its early part of existence are compared to the claimed victories which is doubly misleading, firstly over-claiming was common in all air forces and secondly pilot losses were fewer than aircraft losses. Luckily in the main part of the article which tells the story of its participation to the fighting over East-Prussia also those losses where pilots survived are mentioned.

Ram Them! is a good blow-to-blow article on the Sonderkommando Elbe’s ramming attacks on April 7, 1945 with well-chosen B/W photos. It concentrates to the action between SKdo Elbe and USAAF heavy bombers and doesn’t spend much space on the fighter vs fighter combats between Luftwaffe fighters and USAAF escorts, mentioning only a couple air victories achieved by P-51 pilots or delve much the moral/ethical discussion amongst German commanders on the advisably of ramming attacks. But that is quite understandably, in a short article like this it is good to have a clear focus. The author is in opinion that only ten bombers were lost to the Elbe pilots while Weir in his book on the subject writes that USAAF seems to have lost 13 bombers to the Sonderkommando Elbe pilots. Also according to Caldwell’s Day fighters book Sonderkommando Elbe pilots got 13 or 14 bombers. According to Freeman’s The Mighty Eight War Diary at least eight and according to Boehme’s JG 7 history twelve heavy bombers at most. In the end of the article there is a short note on the Oberst Hajo Herrmann’s final wartime scheme – Sonderkommando Bienenstock, demolition teams flown on Fieseler Fi 156 Storck light STOL planes behind enemy lines.

King of Fighters The Best Single-seater of 1945.
The author rightly pointed out the importance of pilot quality in fighter combat and so paper figures were not all important The article claims that Bell P-63 Kingcobras were used against Germany in small numbers by the Soviets but because of the lack of corroborating evidence Yefim Gordon in his Soviet Air Power in World War 2 (2008) and in his and Sergey Komissarov’s US Aircraft in the Soviet Union and Russia (2008) writes that he/they stick(s) to the generally accepted version of events that the Kingcobras did not see combat on the Soviet-German front. So in its place there should be Bell P-39Q or N, if one Lend-Lease Eastern Front plane is wanted to be included. And why not, P-39 was widely used by Soviets until the end of the war and three (2nd, 3rd and 5th) of their five top aces got most of their kills while flying Airacobra.
While generally acceptable article but on the Soviet fighters there are a number of points on which I have a different view. The maximum climb rate given for the Spitfire LF Mk. IX (4,470 ft/min) seems to be that of the much rarer HF Mk. IX, which was lower than that of the real one for LF Mk IX, namely 5,080 ft/min at sea level and 4,725 ft/min at 2,000 ft with the boost of +25 lb/sq.inch. while using 100/150 grade fuel, and with +18 lb/sq.inch boost (100/130 grade fuel) 4,620 ft/min at sea level. As for Spitfire Mk. XIV the given 4,700 ft/min is correct for +18 lb/sq.inch boost, but during the last 1½ months of the war in Europe +21 lb/sq.inch boost was allowed with 100/150 grade fuel making possible the climb rate of almost 5,100 ft/min at sea level. On the contrary the rate of climb given to Tempest Mk. V (4,700 ft/min) seems to be optimistic, the maximum figure I have seen is 4,380 ft/min at sea level.
On Republic P-47 Thunderbolt the Spitfire version to which it and North American P-51 Mustang are compared is missing, the claims made are true only when the US planes are compared to Spitfire Mk. XIV, Spitfire LF Mk. IX was slower than P-51D at all altitudes and slower than P-47D at medium and high altitudes. And both mentioned US fighters zoomed better than any WWII era Spitfire. And not only Mustang but all WWII fighters powered by liquid-cooled engines were vulnerable to even light battle damage to their cooling system.
Contrary to claim of the author, P-38L didn’t lack stopping power, its armament, while not exceptionally heavy, was a good average for a late war fighter.
Lockheed P-80A had the same six .5 M2 as P-51D Mustang but its machine guns were all concentrated to the nose giving more concentrated and effective fire pattern.
While the first Lavochkin La-7s that reached combat zone had max speed of 406 mph and rate of climb 3,396 fpm, the late La-7s from late 1944 onwards had max speed of 418 mph and rate of climb 4,762 fpm , so in early 1945 and under 2,000m only Hawker Tempest was faster than it and Bf 109K-4 had equal speed. Spitfire Mk. XIV with +21lb boost became faster at little under 3,000 m and with +18lb boost at little under 4,000 m. Spitfire Mk XIV with +21lb boost out climbed it at all altitudes as did Bf 109K-4, but Spitfire Mk. XIV with +18lb only above appr. 1,500 m. La-7 was an excellent low- and medium altitude fighter and these were the altitudes where most of the Eastern Front air combats were fought. It suffered from engine unreliability which arose from the engine installation not from the engine itself. And while roll-over bar was recommended for production La-7s, according to Ves̆ts̆ík’s Lavoc̆kin La-7 book it wasn’t installed and that seems to be the case. But it isn’t all bad, according to the article La-7 had bigger spinner than La-5FN, I don’t remember seeing that information before but when I measured the spinners from the line drawings in Gordon’s Lavochkin’s Piston-Engined Fighters the results confirmed that. So at least according to the line drawings the information is correct. A pair more complains; the second photo seems to shows a Lavochkin La-5F not a La-7 and La-7 was powered by Shvetsov ASh-82FN not by ASh-82FNV, maybe the author means Shvetsov M-82FNV which was the prototype/pre-production version of the engine of which was installed in La-5FNs and La-7s. Its production version was at first designated as Shvetsov M-82FN but soon re-designated as Shvetsov ASh-82FN to honour its chief designer Arkadiy Shvetsov.
On Yak-3 there is a bit different problem, according to Gordon’s Soviet Air Power book the max. speed of it was 398 mph not 407 mph given in the article, but performance, especially the maximum level speed, of the partly wooden Soviet fighters varied even more than the metal Western ones. And I have seen Soviet/Russian graphs showing both 401 and 405 mph as the maximum speed for Yak-3. But again it is the maximum rate of climb that is my main problem, the table in the article shows 3,650 fpm while Soviet graphs showed 4,330 fpm, which is the rate of climb that would explain why Soviet pilots had so high regard on that little fighter and why German pilots thought it being so dangerous opponent. It seems that the author has got his Soviet aircraft specifications from Wikipedia, where somebody has calculated the Soviet rates of climb by simply using the time to altitude information from Gordon’s Soviet Air Power book and converting it to a rate of climb by dividing the altitude (16,400 ft) by the time needed to reach it. The results definitely aren’t the maximum rates of climb of those planes.
While as I wrote above, it seems that Bell P-63 Kingcobra didn’t see combat in Europe during the WWII, the climb data given in article seems to be too low, the internet site says 3,600 ft/min, according to Dean it was even better. This is in line with the time to height information in Gordon’s and Wagner’s books.  According to Dean P-63 had the best rate of climb of the all USAAF fighters seeing series production during WWII.  Otherwise the description of P-63 is ok and rightly pointed out reasons why USAAF didn’t use it as a combat plane, the lack of range and high altitude performance, it was low and middle altitude fighter.
Focke-Wulf Fw 190A-9, the speed given is that without compressibility correction which is the way how German data was rather often given, so almost 10 mph too optimistic when compared other planes whose maximum speeds are usually given with compressibility correction. Also its rate of climb seems to have given as 2,350 ft/min, which is same as given in Kens’ and Nowarra’s old Die deutschen Flugzeuge 1933-1945 and Wood’s/Gunston’s Hitler’s Luftwaffe for Fw 190A-8  when a German document I have seen gives 11.7 m/s which converts to 2,303 ft/min for Fw 190A-9. The same document gives only 9.7 m/s, that is 1,909 ft/min, for Fw 190A-8 but also 14.0 m/s (2,756 ft/min) with emergency power with increased boost.  On the other hand 3,445 ft/min for Fw 190A-8 with 1.42 ata boost is given in my very poor copy of the Focke-Wulf Flugzeugbau-Flugmechanic-L graph dated 12 Jan 1944. The maximum RoC isn’t better with 1,68 ata but this higher boost gives significantly better RoC between 1.500m and 5.500m. The figure 2,677 ft/min A-8 1.32 ata is given in Focke-Wulf Flugzeugbau-Flugmechanic-L graph dated 13 Nov 1943. A Soviet test gives maximum 3,563 ft/min with special power and 3,150 ft/min with the combat power (probably means Steig- und Kampfleistung) but the Fw 190A-8 used in it was without outer wing cannon and also had smaller fuel load and was 314 kgs lighter than the standard Fw 190A-8 in German flight tests graphs. I admit that Fw 190A-9 was a hard nut to open and in the end I didn’t find a reliable source for its rate of climb but IMHO the maximum RoC of a normal Fw 190A-9 fighter should be at least 3,445 ft/min.
The speed of Fw 190D-9 given seems to be some 8 mph optimistic relative to the delivered production aircraft because it assumes the installation of the engine gap seal. On the other hand, the speculation that the speed without MW50 might has been as low as 360 mph is rather odd, Soviet data gives that speed as appr. 390 mph, and Soviet data for Fw 190s tended to be clearly lower than values in German or Western Allied documents. Also the rate of climb value given, 3,300 ft/min, is rather conservative, in early 1945 Fw 190D-9 was capable to 3,405 ft/min with take-off power and 4,232 ft/min with special emergency power (Sonder-Notleistung).
I would not call Messerschmitt Bf 109 as long-suffering. On the Bf 109K-4, only the Bf 109K prototype had a slightly bulged canopy, the production machines had the standard Erla/Galland canopy.
The DB605DM was cleared up to 1.75ata, the DB605DB pushed the limit up to 1.8ata, and both could be sustained with use of either B4 fuel + MW-50 (as mentioned in various documents, even if it was an afterthought in the DM case) or with C3 fuel. With 1.8 ata boost and 2,800 rpm 605DB produced 1,850 ps/1,825 hp. Without MW-50 with B4 fuel it produced 1,430 ps/1,410 hp. However the DB605DC max power, with 1.98 ata boost and 2,800 rpm could be achieved only with use of C3+MW-50. It then produced 2,000 ps/1,973 hp. Problems were the scarcity of methanol for the MW-50 and the limited supply of high octane C3 for Bf 109 units because Fw 190As and Fs could use only it, so usually Bf 109 units had to be content with lower octane B4.
The given range seems to be too short when compared to the Spitfires but the same figure is given in Poruba’s and Janda’s Messerschmitt Bf 109K book. On the other hand Martinek’s article gives the range of Bf 109G-10 as 650 km, which converts into 404 miles and G-10, while otherwise very similar to K-4, had fixed tailwheel and lacked the outer wheel well covers (but often the tailwheel was locked down and outer wheel well covers removed in operational K-4s) so it’s range should have been shorter than that of K-4 or when compared to a K-4 with modifications just given in parentheses, the same. A plane had many different ranges depending on engine settings used and the flight altitude but IMHO the 404 miles range is truer when compared the ranges of Spitfires given in the article.
Messerschmitt Me 262 part is OK but again there was no KG(J) 51, it was simply KG 51.
Messerschmitt Me 163, MK 108 wasn’t slow firing with its 650 rounds/min rate of fire but it had fairly low muzzle velocity, 540 m/s (1,770 ft/s).
On the conclusion part of the article, IMFO Meteor III wasn’t non-operational but because of snaking and its poor rate of roll it wasn’t a top-class fighter in 1945. In the end the author concludes that the choice for the title of the best fighter in the ETO has to be made between Spitfire XIV and Me 262 and he chooses Spitfire XIV. I agree, that if the choice is made without thinking of the range and the combat altitude, the choice is between the two but even with the haste and desperate situation in which Me 262 was rushed into service and all the problems which followed from that, Me 262 would have dominated the duel between these two planes if the combat had begun from equal positions. Spitfire might survive because of its better horizontal manoeuvrability and acceleration but to win it should have to surprise the Me 262 or the Me 262 pilot should have to make a bad error.
So while otherwise passable article on the late war fighters in ETO it fails badly on the Soviet planes.

Then Wee Willie Ran out of Luck, an excellent article on the “career” of the Boeing B-17G-15-BO 42-31333 Wee Willie” and some of the numerous crews who flow combat mission on it during its 128 missions. Also showing the dramatic pictures of its fiery end on April 8, 1945 over Stendal on its 128th mission. My only complaint is that I’d have liked information on what was done to it at the completion and modification centre at Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Next article is on Hans-Guido Mutke’s dive on April 9, 1945. IMHO a bit unnecessary article because we had only Mutke’s word on the incident and he came into public with his story only 44 years after the incident. But this article takes only two pages and also tells how Mutke flying the Me 262A-1a/R1 “White 3” WNr. 500071 ended in Switzerland on 25 April 1945. The plane is nowadays at the Deutsches Museum in München.

Canadians against the Komet. An interesting article, but it still does not give a definite answer what was the target of the only combat use of the Sondergerät SG 500 Jagdfaust. Not that I criticize the author, it is often impossible to dig out the truth because of the overclaiming and conflicting eyewitness report. The lack of the Luftwaffe records doesn’t help, more so when we talked about the last months of the war with all the chaos on the German side. The author things that the Me 163 pilot Fritz Kelb attacked one of the Lancasters of 433 Squadron RCAF or 405 Squadron RCAF. According to Ethell’s & Price’s book, Kelb shot down a B-17. Different Wiki articles give different victim. Wiki article on Me 163 says “resulting in the destruction of a Halifax bomber, although other sources say it was a Boeing B-17”, Wikiarticle on Sondergerät SG 500 Jagdfaust says that “Fritz Kelb downed an RAF Lancaster using it.”

Then a two pages article on the well-known combat between a Piper L-4 Grasshopper and Fieseler Fi 156 Storch.

Piston Engine Zenit, a good and impartial article on Focke-Wulf Ta 152. At first a very short overview of the development and production of the Ta 152 followed by a description of its combat use at JG 301.  But the author forgot the very brief JG 11 part, it got 4 to 6 Ta 152s near the end of April 1945, but during its last movement during the war, from Neustadt-Glewe to Leck, two out of a formation of four Ta152s from the Stab JG11 were shot down by Spitfires during the transfer flight and the third had to make a belly-landing at Lech airfield.

Then an article on a murder of a shot down USAAF P-51 pilot.

And then the article which gave the tittle of this publication, Spitfires Over Berlin, the story of a Spitfire XIV formation from 350 (Belgian) Squadron combating with Focke-Wulf Fw 190s over the western fringes of Berlin. The Belgian side is well told but there is next to nothing on the German side, so very one-sided story. Besides the quotes from the Allied pilots’ combat reports the other interesting point is a couple photos showing rather battered Spitfire XIVs of the 350 (Belgian) Squadron, fitness of some parts of the engine cowling seemed to have been rather poor.

On the other hand the next article on the activities of the Luftwaffe on April 24, 1945 is interesting, even if the situation was hopeless to Germans and fuel reserves were very low, the Luftwaffe flew over 800 combat sortie on that day, of which nearly 500 were fighter sorties, almost 250 fighter-bomber, ground-attack and anti-tank sorties and some 90 recce, most flown by Fw 190s and Bf 109s. With only six pages it is only a short overview as the author himself admit but very interesting one.

The Ringmaster’s Grand Finale. April 26, 1945: JV44 and Adolf Galland.  The article is a good one, so I have nothing to complain on it but the subject. JG 7 was much more important Me 262 fighter unit than Galland’s JV 44 but much less well known, at least in English speaking world, so I would have been much more eager to see an article on the former unit.

Then a nice article on the Heinkel He 162A and the only possible air kill achieved by a He 162A pilot. It also gives information on the all nine fatal accidents suffered by He 162A pilots during its use in WW2, a couple more French and British pilots died in He 162A accidents after the war but that is outside the scope of this publication. These is even a photo of the wreck of Flying Officer Tom Austin‘s Tempest V JN877 but it is also clearly stated that we will probably never know for sure if Leutnant Rudolf Schmitt shot down the Tempest because of the time difference and not even the place where the Tempest crashed was exactly a match with the combat area reported by Schmitt. Austin reported that he had suffered a catastrophic engine failure and some sources say that the loss was allocated to a German AA unit. There are several fairly small photos of He 162As but what I miss is a photo showing the ventilation disc on the port side of the canopy of He 162.

The last but one article, Final Dogfight May 8, 1945 gives one probably answer but in fact there were later air combats in Europe, mostly friendly fire cases. USAAF Lockheed F-5 photo-reconnaissance planes (unarmed version of the famous Lockheed P-38 Lightning fighter plane) of the 39th Photographic Reconnaissance Squadron/10th Photographic Group, belonging to the 9th U.S. Air Force were then operating from Y-10 airfield in Wiesbaden, Germany.
On 8 May 1945, the unit was on a Prisoner-of-War Camp Pin-Pointing Mission in Dresden airspace, i.e. in the area recently seized by Soviet troops. Several Soviet Yak fighters of the 106th Guards Fighter Air Regiment from Cottbus airfield attacked Captain Malcolm L. Nash. Second Lieutenant Lazuta wrongly took Nash´s F-5E for a German Focke Wulf Fw 189 (twin-fuselage plane like F-5), and shot it down in Reichenbach area, approx. 40 kilometres West of Dresden. Captain Nash made a belly landing in the field. Though he escaping serious injury his F-5E was totally demolished.
On 9 May 1945 afternoon, the 39th Photo-Reconnaissance Squadron sent six Lockheed F-5s to search for the missing Capt. Nash. Two of the F-5s piloted by 1/Lt Thomas P. Petrus and 2/Lt. Thomas Jackson, flew as far as Prague. By coincidence, this happened when six Soviet US built Bell P-39 Airacobras patrolled the area. They were part of the 100th Guards Fighter Air Regiment. Soviet fighters covered Soviet tanks advancing to Prague, and one of them, Major Vasilyi A. Pschenitchnikov, took the American twin-fuselage F-5 for a German Fw 189 and shot down the plane over Prague. While 1/Lt Petrus, suffering heavy burns, saved his life on parachute, Maj. Pschenitchnikov on his return added to his score the kill of „Fw 189“, his thirteenth and the last WW2 kill.
There was also at least one another dogfight on 9 May: Ju88, from possibly II/KG200 (144032), was attacked and damaged by FAA fighters over Skagerrak.
And on 11May 1945 Anson XII PH539 of the Desert Air Force Communication Flight was attacked by three Yak fighters while off course. It force-landed in a field near Graz, Austria and struck trees.

The last article is Aftermath May 9, 1945 and beyond. It is on the Allied war booty planes and scientific intelligence during the last days of the war and immediate afterwards. There is a list of the Watson’s Whizzers’ Me 262s and a list of the German aircraft captured by the British and US. Surprisingly it seems that  British gave all four Focke-Wulf 190Ds they had captured to US while they kept few 190As and F-8s plus a two of the three Ta 152Hs themselves.  Not surprisingly there are many night-fighters, mostly Junkers Ju 88G-6s but I was a little surprised of the number of Messerschmitt Me 163Bs captured by British, at least 23.

All in all I am very positively surprised at this purchase, almost all articles are good and interesting with well-chosen pictures, almost all them clear even if some are rather small in size. It gives interesting and many-sided picture of the last five months of the air war on the Western Front. Only major complains is the lack of articles on the Soviet Air Forces and the underestimations of the performance of Soviet fighters.

Main sources:
Motorenmustern for DB 605D series engines

Boehme, Manfred, JG 7 The World’s First Jet Fighter Unit 1944/1945 (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 1992).
Caldwell, Donald, Day Fighters in Defence of the Reich A War Diary, 1942 – 45 (Barnsley: Frontline Books,
               2011).
Dean, Francis H., America’s Hundred-Thousand The U.S. Production Fighters of World War II (Atglen, PA:
               Schiffer Publishing, 1997).
Ethell, Jeffrey & Price, Alfred, World War II Fighting Jets (Shrewsbury: Airlife Publishing, 1994).
Foreman, John and Harvey, S. E., Me 262 Combat Diary (New Malden: Air Research Publications, 1990).
Freeman, Roger A., The Mighty Eight War Diary (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1990).
Gordon, Yefim, Lavochkin’s Piston-Engined Fighters (Hinckley: Midland Publishing, 2003).
Gordon, Yefim, Soviet Air Power in World War 2 (Hinckley: Midland Publishing, 2008).
Hermann, Dietmar & Wunderlich, Markus, Die kurze Karriere der Focke-Wulf Ta 152, Flugzeug Classic, Apr.
                2010.
Kens, Karlheinz and Nowarra, Heinz J., Die deutschen Flugzeuge 1933-1945 (München: J.F. Lehmann Verlag,
                2. Ausgabe, 1964)
Manhro, John and Pütz, Ron, Bodenplatte The Luftwaffe’s Last Hope (Crowborough: Hikoki Publications,
                2004).
Martinek, Josef, ‘Bf 109G-10 – the most agile “Gustav”’, Zlínek, No. 4 / Vol. III.
Murawski, Marek J., JG 1 “Oesau” 1944-1945 (Lublin: KAGERO, 2002).
Poruba,T and Janda, A, Messerschmitt Bf 109K (Hradec Králové: JaPo, 1997).
Price, Alfred, The Spitfire Story (London: Cassell & Co, Revised Second Edition, 2002).
Shores, Christopher and Williams, Clive, Aces High (London: Grub Street 1994).
Smith, J. Richard and Creek, Eddie j., Me 262 Volume Three (Crowborough: Classic Publications, 2000).
Ves̆ts̆ík, Milos̆, Lavoc̆kin La-7 (Praha: MBI, 2000).
Wagner, Ray (Ed.), American Combat Planes (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., New
               Revised Edition, 1968)
Weir, Adrian, The Last Flight of the Luftwaffe (London: Cassell & Co, 2000).
Wood, Tony/Gunston, Bill, Hitler’s Luftwaffe. A pictorial and technical encyclopedia of Hitler’s air power in
               World War II (:Leisure Books, Reprinted, 1984).

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spitfire-IX.html
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http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/fw190/leistungsdaten-1-10-44.jpg
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/fw190/fw190d9test.html
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/Methanol.pdf
http://users.atw.hu/kurfurst/articles/MW_KvsXIV.htm  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daimler-Benz_DB_605#Variants
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Messerschmitt_Me_163_Komet
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jagdfaust
http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/showthread.php?t=40780
http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/showthread.php?t=7258