Marco Mattioli’s SAVOIA-MARCHETTI S.79 SPARVIERO TORPEDO-BOMBER UNITS Osprey Combat Aircraft • 106 (2014) 96 pages.

One of the better Osprey books, based on what the Italian torpedo planes really achieved, not on what they claimed.

The first poor results with level bomber attacks against Allied ships forced Italians to form its first experimental torpedo-bomber unit on 25 July 1940, about 1½ month after Italy’s entry to the WWII. The first torpedo attack was made on 15 August 1940. So to my surprise the Italians were definitely a late comer to the torpedo-bomber field. The fact that the Luftwaffe sent its first landplane torpedo-bomber crews to Italy to get torpedo training and the fact that Italians had several successes with torpedo bombers during the WWII had made me to believe that Italians had longer experience with torpedo-bombers.

I was surprised how few planes made most of the early Italian attacks, usually only two or three planes participating. E.g. in December 1941 three Sparvieri attacked a Royal Navy formation of three Anti-Aircraft cruisers and eight destroyers. Not surprisingly they achieved nothing in good visibility. But sometimes those attacks by a couple S-79s were successful. The small formation size was a big contrast to e.g. IJNAF twin-engine torpedo planes attacks, e.g. against the Force Z (consisted of the battleship HMS Prince of Wales, the battlecruiser HMS Repulse and four destroyers) on 10 December 1941. In the spring of 1942 there were the first bigger formation attacks, 9 – 12 planes attacking same time early in 1942 and up to 41 against the Pedestal convoy in August 1942. In early November 1942, a couple days before the opening of the Operation Torch, Italians concentrating 75 S.79 and 25 S.84 torpedo bombers on Sicily and Sardinia. That didn’t mean massive torpedo attacks against the invasion fleets, the biggest S.79 attack consisted 14 torpedo-bombers and usually formations consisted of under 10 planes. They didn’t achieve much, the Allies only lost the sloop HMS Ibis. The effective defense of Allies forced Italians to initiate night attacks, and after they lost from 27 March to 10 April 1943 ten aircrews out of 25 engaged in daytime actions and had sunk only the 9,545-ton freighter Empire Rowan in return, Italians abandoned daytime torpedo attacks altogether.

When the Allies invaded Sicily in July 1943, the S.79 torpedo-bomber force numbered 99 aircraft, of which 41 were airworthy. Their only success was a hit on the fleet carrier HMS Indomitable.

On the page 23 there is an odd claim that a head-on torpedo attack would force the target ship to slow down. In fact the standard evasion maneuver was to turn towards attacking torpedo planes and so to give the smallest target to them. And anyway it takes time to slow down a ship. The attack described seems to have been a variation of the standard “anvil” attack in which one torpedo plane/group of torpedo planes approaches 45deg right off the bow and another 45deg left off the bow. If the target ship turns towards one attacker/group of attackers it gives to the other one clean broadside drop.

I was surprised how effective Blenheim fighters were against Savoia-Marchetti S.79s (meaning that they accomplished something) and how ineffective Beaufighters were (many times they managed only to damage S.79s, I had expected that a fighter armed with four 20mm cannons and six machine guns would have been more effective against rather archaic looking mixed construction three motor) during the early part of the war.

S.79 torpedo-bombers got their last success before Italy’s armistice was achieved on the night of 7 September 1943 when the 1625-ton British LST-417 was torpedoed and forced to run aground on the shore near Termini Imerese on Sicily.

While I have been aware on the German actions against Italian fleet after the Italy’s armistice on 8 September 1943 their actions against Italian planes trying to fly to Allied-controlled areas were new to me. Out of 34 Sparvieri which had set off for Allied-control territory, two were shot down by Bf 109G pilots of JG 77 who also forced three other S.79s to turn back. One crew flew north voluntarily.

 After armistice on 8 September 1943

Those Sparvieri which ended under Allied control were principally used as transport and liaison duties. Italians who chose to continue fight alongside Germany joined the Repubblica Sociale Italiana (RSI), in northern Italy, which was created towards the end of September 1943.  Between the autumn and winter of that year RSI organized its own air force, the Aeronautica Repubblicana, later redesignated the Aeronautica Nazionale Repubblicana (ANR). The first mission against Allies’ Anzio beachhead was flown on the night of 10 March 1943 by six S.79s but it was unsuccessful and one Sparviero was lost. The only success of the ANR Sparvieri occurred on 4 August 1944 when during the attack of three Greece based Sparvieri the 7100- British freighter Samsylarna was torpedoed north of Benghazi and forced to run aground. The last mission of the ANR Sparvieri torpedo bombers was flown on late 5 January 1945 by two Sparvieri crews. Through 1944-45 ANR Sparvieri succeeded in damaging just one freighter for the loss of about 100 airmen. 11 actions were fought, during which 50 torpedoes were dropped.

During the war Sparviero was the most effective antishipping weapon Italy had, the Sparviero units sunk 21 ships (nine warships and 12 freighters) and damaged 17 others (11 warships and six merchantmen).

There are some quotes from Italian combat reports and memoirs on some actions. The big plus is that while Italians’ claims are mentioned they are checked against Allied records and it is clearly mentioned what claims can be verified from Allied reports, same thoroughness is seen in several other Osprey books of this series, e.g. Osamu Tagaya’s Mitsubishi Type 1 Rikko ʽBetty’ Units of World War 2. There are many interesting photos, even some dramatic action photos, but most of the photographs are small. And of course the colour profiles, many of them very interesting as one can predict when Italian planes are in question. There are also 12 unit badges in colour. There are four appendices: S.79 torpedo-bomber units (giving basic facts of the units’ histories), S.79 warships kills 1940-43, S.79 merchant ship kills 1941-44 and S.79 Gold Medal for Military Valour recipients.

Altogether an excellent addition to one’s library.

Forczyk’s book is IMHO good. For its size it gives a good background information, describes enough the actions and gives good overview on the importance of Focke-Wulf Fw 200C to the Battle of Atlantic and reasons for its early successes and its ultimate failure against Allied convoys. The two maps convey very well the essentials of Condors’ anti-convoy operations and the four tables are clear and convey well the essential information as do the diagrams on anti-aircraft systems of armed merchant ships  and low-level attack  tactic used by Condors. But there is at least one mistake in the table “Condor losses by cause”. The 3rd column header “AA from land/merchant ship” should be “AA from merchant ship/ land” or the numbers in the column should be reversed.

Typically to Duel series there is chronology and two minibiographies, that of Edgar Petersen, quite self-evident choice and that of Eric Brown, the very famous test pilot, maybe not so self-evident choice but Brown was one of the Martlet pilots on the Royal Navy’s  first escort carrier HMS Audacity whole of its short career and claimed two Fw 200 Condors. And the arrival of escort carriers was really the turning point  in the Fw 200 Condors vs Atlantic convoys battle.

Forczyk is more in home with Condor than with Royal Navy's  weapon systems. Contrary what Forczyk writes, 12pdr(3”) wasn’t the main heavy AA gun of Royal Navy in 30s, 4” was and at the end of decade 4.5” dual purpose gun had entered  in service. 12pdr might be the most common heavy AA gun installed onto merchant vessels during the WWII but that is a different thing.  And the rate of fire wasn’t the main problem of 2pdr pom-pom besides the unreliability of early versions, it wasn’t significantly lower than that of excellent 40mm Bofors, but the fairly low muzzle velocity of the pom-pom was.

The Royal Navy had begun to understand the need for anti-aircraft protection of Great Britain’s merchant shipping by late 30s and sloops constructed in late 30s had powerful AA armament. Bittern-class sloops, 2 of the 3 ships had six 4" AA guns (3x2), HACS AA fire control director, four .5" AA guns (1x4) and Egret-class sloops, 3 ships, 8 x 4-inch AA guns (4x2), Fuze Keeping Clock AA fire control system, 4 x .5-inch AA (1x4) were commissioned 1936 – 39 and just nearing completion were first of the  Black Swans, 12 were launched between 1939 and 1943, including four for the Royal Indian Navy; twenty-five Modified Black Swans were launched between 1942 and 1945, including two for the Royal Indian Navy. Their armament was 6 × QF 4 in (102 mm) Mk XVI AA guns (3 × 2), Fuze Keeping Clock AA fire control system, 4 × 2pdr AA pom-pom plus 4 × 0.5-inch (12.7 mm) AA machine guns (original), 12 × 20 mm Oerlikon AA (6 × 2) (modified). The first of Black Swans was commissioned on 3 November 1939 and the second on 27 January 1940 and 3 more during the first part of 41, i.e. at the height of the Condor menace.

Also there were the Hunts of which 19 were commissioned in 1940. They were modeled on the 1938 escort sloop Bittern. The Hunt class was to ship the same armament of three twin Mark XIX mounts for the QF 4-inch (102 mm) gun Mark XVI. The guns were controlled by a Fuze Keeping Clock AA fire control computer when engaging aircraft plus a quadruple QF 2 pounder mount Mark VII. While sloops were restricted to speeds under 20knots by a treaty Hunts were small destroyers with top speed of 27 knots (50 km/h). The first twenty were ordered in March and April 1939. They were constructed to Admiralty standards, as were contemporary destroyers, unlike the frigates which conformed much more to mercantile practice. The demanding specifications in an overworked Admiralty design department resulted in a major design miscalculation. When the detailed calculations were done the centre of gravity was lower than expected and the beam was increased. As the first ships were being completed it was found that the design was as much as 70 tons overweight, top heavy, leaving them dangerously deficient in stability. The first twenty ships were so far advanced in construction that it was necessary to remove the 'X' 4 inch mount and add 50 tons of permanent ballast. These ships became the Type I group, and had the multiple 2 pounder gun relocated from behind the funnel to the more advantageous 'X' position. The design deficiency of the Type I was rectified by splitting the hulls lengthwise and adding a 2½ foot section, increasing the beam and the margin of stability sufficiently for the designed armament to be shipped. These ships became the Type II group. Under the 1939 Emergency War Programme 36 more Hunts had been ordered: three of these were completed to the original (Type I) design.

The main problem for the RN was that the unexpected collapse of France and occupation of Norway by Germany not only opened opportunity for Condors to attack against southern convoy routes but also allowed medium-bomber anti-shipping attacks in Irish Sea and in the waters around Ireland, so these ships were urgently needed besides the North Sea also in this new danger area.

Analyze seems otherwise good, but near the end the 20mm Oerlikon fixation goes to annoying dimensions. Even after Forczyk has told that the more powerful anti-aircraft protection of convoys had forced KG 40 to abandon the low-level attacks and with the new Fw 200C-4 version, which was equipped with the good Lofte 7B bombsight, it began to bomb from 3,000m (10,000ft) to avoid light automatic AA fire, he still regard the number of Oerlikons as measurement of how good AA defense a convoy had.

Another small error in the book is that the first escort carrier with a hangar deck wasn’t HMS Biter but both HMS Archer and HMS Avenger  had begun to escort convoys already during the spring 1942.

In spite of some errors the book is a good introduction to Fw 200 Condor and its use as maritime bomber and reconnaissance bomber and the Allied efforts to combat this menace.